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INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis in 2008 stirred a debate about the state’s role in 
the monitoring of the financial markets.  The once-dominant neolib-
eral approach weakened, and various reforms in the state’s financial 
regulation were suggested.  Many of the reforms called for more in-
tense state involvement, others called for a more cautious approach.  
Much less attention, however, was paid to the state’s role in monitor-
ing local finances.  Although the crisis no doubt affected localities, 
and despite predictions of massive local defaults, there was little dis-
cussion about the state’s supervision of local fiscal policies.  What dif-
ficulties does the state face in monitoring these issues and how can we 
mitigate these difficulties?  This Article aims to explore these issues, 
in light of the Israeli experience. It demonstrates the pitfalls in the 
state’s monitoring, and suggests partial solutions. 
My main argument is that political interests frustrate efficient state 
monitoring. State politicians do not always internalize the costs of a 
local crisis, and they may even benefit from local economic weakness.  
They prefer to maintain the local dependency on the central govern-
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ment’s funds, thereby strengthening their own position vis-à-vis the 
local leadership.  An interesting metaphor for the state-local relation-
ship in Israel can be found in the famous fable about the frog and the 
scorpion.  The scorpion asks the frog to carry it across the river.  In 
the middle of the way, the scorpion stings the frog and they both 
drown.  The stunned frog asks the scorpion why it did that, and the 
scorpion replies, “It is my nature.”  The same is true with regard to 
the policies of Israel’s central government toward the local sector. 
Although the local crisis was detrimental to both localities and the 
central government, the state politicians were largely responsible for 
it.  The nature of Israel’s political system incentivized them to shift 
costs and to underfund the local sector until it was on the verge of fi-
nancial collapse. 
In 2004–2005, localities in Israel underwent a severe fiscal crisis.  
About three quarters of the local governments suffered from defi-
cits—most of them had deficits of over 30% of their annual budgets.1  
Defaults were prevalent, employees worked for months without com-
pensation, and basic services were not provided.2  A large portion of 
the local sector was unable to finance the public goods for which lo-
calities were legally responsible.3  This Article shows that much of the 
responsibility for this local crisis lies with the state.  Since the 1980s, 
various socioeconomic and political processes joined together and 
created an environment that facilitated the creation of huge local def-
icits.  The central government shifted more and more responsibilities 
to the slim shoulders of the local sector,4 but it failed to finance these 
additional obligations.5  On the contrary, the state significantly de-
creased independent revenues.6  In addition, although the state had 
ample authorities to supervise local expenditures,7 it failed to do so.8  
 
* Assistant Professor, Haifa University School of Law. This Article was originally 
presented at the 2011 Fordham Urban Law Journal Cooper-Walsh Colloquium. I 
would like to thank Fred Tung and all the participants in the Colloquium for provid-
ing wonderful discussions and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Spe-
cial thanks are also due to Yael Achilea for her assistance at various stages of the 
writing. 
 1. ISRAEL CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN ISRAEL 
2006, 4 (2007).  
 2. See infra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 8. See id.  
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The state did not force localities to be fiscally disciplined, and it did 
not sanction localities for violating regulatory duties, even when these 
violations were readily known and could be corrected cheaply.9  State 
politicians preferred to ignore the local plight rather than take actions 
to correct it.10 
After examining the state’s responsibility for the local crisis, I ex-
plore the motives behind the state’s behavior.  I argue that Israel’s 
political structure incentivized state politicians to neglect the munici-
pal sector and to create a lax supervision system over local finance.  
Within the Israeli national political system, local issues are not con-
sidered an important factor.  State politicians are not rewarded for in-
vesting resources in distressed localities, and they are not punished 
for the creation of local deficits.  They are better off, therefore, un-
der-financing municipalities, and spending the state’s funds on other 
purposes from which they enjoy political dividends.  Underfunding 
the local sector has an additional benefit: it forces municipalities to 
beg constantly for assistance, thereby giving state officials the power 
to decide who will receive additional funding and who will not.  
Moreover, due to the mayors’ power in the national parties, state pol-
iticians are reluctant to confront them.  Mayors are allowed to over-
spend and violate state regulations because the minister of interior, 
who is in charge of the state’s monitoring system, needs the mayors’ 
support for his political career.  Using Israeli cases, I illustrate the in-
herent conflict between the interests of the individual politician and 
the state’s monitoring duties. 
Drawing on the Israeli experience, I then identify two mechanisms 
that can decrease the weight of the political interests.  One is an effi-
cient municipal credit market, and the other is an established statuto-
ry procedure for the state’s intervention.  The credit market compels 
the central government to internalize some of the costs of the local 
crisis and incentivizes state officials to take action.  Evidence from the 
United States shows that states assist local governments to recover 
from fiscal crises because they are apprehensive of crises’ contagion 
effects on the municipal bond markets.  The Israeli experience, on the 
other hand, suggests that the lack of an efficient credit market aggra-
vates the local plight and holds back local reforms.  A statutory pro-
cedure for the state’s response in the face of local distress can also de-
crease political pressures.  Especially when implemented by an 
 
 9. See infra notes 91–92, 99 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 108–14 and accompanying text. 
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insulated state agency, such a procedure can serve as a commitment 
device and constrain state politicians in their actions.  While these 
mechanisms cannot guarantee that the state will monitor effectively, 
evidence shows that they may have positive effects on the local fiscal 
health. 
Although this Article focuses on Israel as a case study, the political 
dynamics it describes are not unique to a particular country.  Similar 
problems also surface in the United States, where political interests 
get in the way of efficient state supervision on local finance.  Bridge-
port’s crisis, for example, was partly the result of state-local rela-
tions,11 and the roots of the Orange County bankruptcy were also 
connected to the state.12  A study of the difficulties in the state’s mon-
itoring can help improve local finances by helping us understand the 
motives behind the state’s local policies, so that we can structure the 
state’s monitoring system accordingly. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISRAELI LOCAL CRISIS 
In 2004–2005, local governments in Israel were in a severe fiscal 
crisis.13  The crisis was not experienced by just a few localities with 
problematic financial practices, but rather it encompassed a signifi-
cant portion of the municipal sector.  In 2004, no fewer than 75% of 
the local governments (190 out of 255 municipalities) suffered from a 
budget deficit and had difficulties paying their debts when due.14  In 
2005, the percentage of the localities in deficit declined a bit to 56%, 
 
 11. Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of 
Bridgeport as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANK. DEV. J. 625, 
663 (1995). Brown describes Bridgeport’s municipal bankruptcy as a political power 
struggle between the state and the city. She argues that Connecticut’s officials were 
motivated by their own political interests and not by the best interests of Bridgeport’s 
residents. Id. 
 12.  MARK BALDSSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENTS FAIL, THE ORANGE COUNTY 
BANKRUPTCY 25–29 (1997). Although the bankruptcy was the result of bad invest-
ments made by the county’s treasurer, California shares much of the responsibility. 
California shifted costs to its local governments, but at the same time limited, through 
Proposition 13, their ability to generate revenues. Id. 
 13. ISRAEL CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 4. Israel’s local 
government sector consists of about 255 localities. These localities can be divided into 
three categories: municipalities (usually cities with 20,000 residents or more), local 
councils (with usually fewer than 20,000 residents), and regional councils (which are 
federations of several rural villages). All three types of local authorities experienced 
the crisis. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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but over 75% of those municipalities (107 municipalities) suffered 
from a deficit that reached over 30% of their yearly budget.15 
Many municipalities in those days did not have enough funds even 
to pay salaries.  In May 2004, 35% of the localities were unable to pay 
their employees, and many municipalities kept workers without com-
pensation for months.16  In a private workplace employees might sue 
their employer for the payment they deserve, but it was pointless to 
sue Israeli local governments.  All potentially sizeable local assets 
were already repossessed by banks or by other creditors,17 and there 
was no way to enforce the judgment.18  Thousands of employees, 
therefore, worked in the local government sector for nothing.19 
Some municipalities failed to provide even the most basic and es-
sential public services.20 There were shortages or shutdowns of water 
and electricity supply because municipalities could not pay electricity 
and water bills.21  Garbage was not collected frequently enough and 
posed health hazards.22  Infrastructure was not maintained properly, 
and even school houses were kept in poor physical condition.23  Alt-
hough some municipalities did better than others, the local sector in 
 
 15. See id.  
 16. THE KNESSET RESEARCH CENTER, WITHHOLDING SALARIES TO LOCAL GOV-
ERNMENTS’ EMPLOYEES (2004) (Isr.), http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m0138 
9.pdf.  
 17. See the explanatory comments to the Budget Foundations Act (Amend. No. 
31), 2004, SH No. 1943 (Isr.). 
 18. Unlike commercial corporations in such conditions, municipalities cannot be 
liquidated, because the Companies Ordinance, the Israeli equivalent of Chapter 7 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code, does not apply to municipalities. See Companies 
Ordinance, 1999, SH No. 1105  164 (Isr.); cf. 17 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 49:44 (3d 
ed. 2011).  
 19. Haim Biur, 16,500 Local Governments’ Employees Did Not Receive Salaries 
for Two Months; Local Governments Say That the Payments Are Delayed Because 
of Severe Deficits, THE MARKER (Dec. 11, 2003), http://www.themarker.com/career/ 
1.178210. See also Reverse Unemployment: Thousands Work but Do Not Get Com-
pensated, YNET (Dec. 10, 2003), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-2836537,00.ht 
ml. 
 20. See, e.g., HCJ Appeal No. 4815/05, Israel vs. Local Council of Arabea (May 
20, 2006) Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); DC Bankruptcy (TA) 2419/07 
In re The Municipality of Taibe, A Special Report of the Trustee (Nov. 18, 2007) 
(Isr.) (on file with author). 
 21. HCJ Appeal No. 4815/05, Israel vs. Local Council of Arabea, at 4; see also 
ISRAEL COMPTROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 2008, 285 (2009) 
[hereinafter ISRAEL COMPTROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT 2008], available at http://www. 
mevaker.gov.il/serve/contentTree.asp?bookid=541&id=96&contentid=&parentcid=u
ndefined&sw=1024&hw=698. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
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general, and especially Arab localities,24 did not perform even basic 
functions. 
The development of such a severe local crisis begs the question, 
how could Israel, now a member of the OECD, allow the local sector 
to deteriorate to this level?  What caused so many localities to practi-
cally go bankrupt?  In the following sections, I examine these ques-
tions, focusing mainly on the role the state played.  I show that the 
state had a crucial role in the local deterioration and that it neglected 
its duties to monitor local finance.  I do not mean to negate other im-
portant causes of the crisis by focusing on the state.  The causes are 
varied, and certainly there were cases of mismanagement and corrup-
tion not connected to the state.  The scope of the crisis shows, howev-
er, that in addition to the specific reasons of each local distress, some-
thing was wrong structurally.  There were common processes, many 
of them connected to state policies, that led to the decline of the en-
tire local sector, and it is those processes I wish to explore. 
A. Socioeconomic Processes 
Although the crisis erupted in the new millennium, its roots can be 
traced back decades, to the 1980s or even earlier.25 During the 1980s 
Israel faced great economic and social challenges.  From an economic 
perspective, Israel suffered from a national economic crisis.  In the 
mid-80s, inflation reached a yearly rate of almost 500%, and there 
was a growing problem of national deficit and payment imbalance.26  
From a social perspective, Israel increasingly turned into a fragment-
ed society.  It was no longer the small, unified country it had been in 
the 1950s and 60s, and due to large waves of immigration it became 
torn between different cultural and political segments and views.27 
 
 24. Id.  For a general overview of the poor financial condition of Arab local gov-
ernments, see Yousef T. Jabareen, Arab-Palestinian Local Governance in Israel at a 
Glance: Challenges and Opportunities, BOELL.ORG (June 12, 2011), http://www.boell. 
org.il/web/97-383.html. 
 25. Nahum Ben-Elia, The Municipal Crisis in Israel: The Management Failure 
and the Challenge of Recovery (Floersheimer Inst. For Pol’y Stud., Working Paper 
No. 1/23, 1998) (Isr.) [hereinafter Ben-Elia, Municipal Crisis]. 
 26. Michael Bruno, Sharp Disinflation Strategy: Israel 1985, 1 ECON. POL’Y 379, 
380 (1986); Linda Sharaby, Israel’s Economic Growth: Success Without Security, 6 
MIDDLE E. REV. INT’L AFF. 25, 30 (2002).  
 27. Eliezer David Jaffe, Ethnic and Minority Groups in Israel: Challenges for So-
cial Work Theory and Practice, 22 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 149, 150 (1995); Nahum 
Ben-Elia, The Fourth Generation: A New Local Government For Israel 19 
(Floersheimer Inst. For Pol’y Stud., Working Paper No. 1/52, 2004) (Isr.) [hereinafter 
Ben-Elia, The Fourth Generation]. 
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The combination of these social and economic challenges created a 
process of decentralization.28  The decentralization was not the fruit 
of an organized and systematic thinking, but rather it was, as Nahum 
Ben Elia phrases it, “decentralization by default.”29  The central gov-
ernment could no longer cope with the growing needs of the different 
communities, and local authorities filled the vacuum.30  Thus, since 
the 1980s, often without a proper statutory basis, the local govern-
ment sector started to broaden its scope of authority.31  Localities 
branched out from the provision of the “purely local” goods and ser-
vices, and they entered into areas that were traditionally under the 
central government’s realm of authority.32  Localities started to deal 
with areas such as education, welfare policies, economic develop-
ment, and even some aspects of national security.33  They increasingly 
developed a perception of an over-arching responsibility to the wel-
fare of their residents, partly as a result of over-ambitious mayors and 
partly as result of the weakness of the central government.34 
The growing responsibilities of the local sector, however, did not 
come without a cost.  To provide the additional services, municipali-
ties had to increase their workforce and spend more.35 Thus, whereas 
in the beginning of the 1980s, the local governments’ current expendi-
tures amounted to less than fifteen billion shekels per year, in 2001 
current expenditures reached 33.5 billion shekels (both in 2002 pric-
es)—an increase of 125%.36  According to Ben-Elia, population 
growth can account for approximately 60% of this expenditure in-
crease, but the rest of the growth is attributed to the broadening 
scope of local services.37 
 
 28. Ben-Elia, The Fourth Generation, supra note 27, at 22–26; Ben-Elia, Munici-
pal Crisis, supra note 25, at 8. 
 29. Nahum Ben-Elia, Policymaking and Management in Israeli Local Govern-
ment: Evolving Trends and Strategic Challenges, 21 POL’Y STUD. J. 115, 117 (1993) 
[hereinafter Ben-Elia, Policymaking]. 
 30. Ben-Elia, The Fourth Generation, supra note 27, at 22–23; Ben-Elia, Munici-
pal Crisis, supra note 25, at 8. 
 31. Ben-Elia, Municipal Crisis, supra note 25, at 8. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Ben-Elia, The Fourth Generation, supra note 27, at 23.  
 36. Id. at 24; Ben-Elia, Municipal Crisis, supra note 25, at 12–14. The amounts in-
clude current expenses such as salaries, operational activities and loan repayments. 
They do not include irregular budget expenditures, such as high cost infrastructure, 
transportation, lighting, and drainage, which are typically financed by specific gov-
ernmental grants, donations, and special loans.  
 37. Ben-Elia, The Fourth Generation, supra note 27, at 23. 
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The problem was that this increase in expenditures was not accom-
panied by a corresponding increase in revenues.  To the contrary, the 
state tightened the local revenue sources, so that revenues were insuf-
ficient to cover the growing costs.38  The state, in this respect, acted in 
two directions: it significantly decreased the intergovernmental 
grants, but at the same time it also limited local fiscal autonomy, con-
straining localities’ ability to raise taxes.39 
The reduction of intergovernmental transfers was particularly se-
vere.  In light of the national economic crisis—the recession and hy-
per-inflation40—the Ministry of Finance cut two major sources of in-
tergovernmental transfers: transferred revenues and general grants.41  
Transferred revenues were portions of certain state taxes that were 
transferred to localities according to a specific formula.42  Since the 
mid-1980s the Ministry gradually decreased the transfer of these tax 
revenues, until in the mid-1990s the transfer was eliminated altogeth-
er.43 Localities lost a significant source of income—about a billion 
shekels a year, and have not been compensated for this loss ever 
 
 38. See id. Municipal revenues can be divided into two major sources: independ-
ent revenues and intergovernmental grants. Independent revenues are revenues col-
lected directly from the local residents (businesses and individuals). See Guy Navon, 
Budgeting Dynamics in Local Authorities in Israel, 4 ISR. ECON. REV. 19, 22 (2006). 
They are levied by the local government, and typically include municipal taxes, fees 
for municipal services, fees for use of municipal property and more. Id. Intergovern-
mental transfers are funds transferred from one level of government to another, usu-
ally from central to local authorities. Id. In Israel the intergovernmental transfers can 
be divided into three major sources: specific grants, general grants, and transferred 
revenues. See Eran Razin, The Impact of Decentralization on Fiscal Disparities 
Among Local Authorities in Israel, 2 SPACE & POLITY 49, 53 (1998) [hereinafter 
Razin, Impact of Decentralization]. Specific grants are grants provided by the central 
government to finance specific services, such as education, welfare and sometimes 
infrastructure. See id. General grants, also called equalization grants, are grants dis-
tributed to fill the general gap between local needs and resources. See id. These 
grants have a substantial redistributive element. Transferred revenues are a portion 
of certain state taxes that were transferred to localities according to a specific formu-
la. Id. 
 39. See Razin, Impact of Decentralization, supra note 38, at 53.  
 40. Bruno, supra note 26, at 380–84.  
 41. See Razin, Impact of Decentralization, supra note 38, at 53. 
 42. See id.  
 43. Nahum Ben-Elia, Government Finance and the Fiscal Crisis in Israeli Local 
Authorities 19 (Floersheimer Inst. For Pol’y Stud., Working Paper No. 1/37, 1999) 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Ben-Elia, Government Finance].  The State’s Comptroller criti-
cized the central government for this reduction, but to no avail. See ISRAEL COMP-
TROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NO. 43 FOR YEAR 1992, 512–
18 (1993), http://www.mevaker.gov.il/serve/folderAdmin.asp?id=151&opentree=,11, 
2. 
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since.44  In addition, the central government cut the amount of gen-
eral grants by 80%, from a level of 3.5 billion shekels in 1980 to 700 
million in 1986.45 General grants are distributed to fill the gap be-
tween local needs and resources, and so weak municipalities—those 
that could not finance their expenses in good times—suffered the 
most from this decrease.46  Although from 1987 onwards there was a 
gradual increase in the amount of grants, it took about a decade for 
general grants to return to their original levels.47  In the beginning of 
the new millennium, however, the central government again severely 
cut general grants.  In 2003, the government reduced the grants by 
25% and in 2004, by an additional 7.5%.48  Many see these reductions 
as the trigger for the pervasive local crisis—the straw that broke the 
camel’s back.49 
In addition, the state also put limits on the ability of local govern-
ments to levy taxes.50  In 1985, in an effort to combat inflation, the 
central government implemented a national stabilization program, 
freezing all prices and wages in the market.51  Initially local property 
taxes were exempt from the general freeze,52 but since many localities 
abused their authority, raising taxes to unprecedented levels, the cen-
tral government decided to include them in the stabilization pro-
gram.53  In 1992, the Knesset rendered the temporary limitations on 
fiscal autonomy permanent, and curtailed, by statute, localities’ abil-
ity to tax their residents.54  According to the state’s legislation, the 
minister of finance together with the minister of interior set minimum 
 
 44. The ministry of finance argued that local governments were compensated for 
this loss through increases in general intergovernmental grants, but there is no evi-
dence of such compensation. See Ben-Elia, The Fourth Generation, supra note 27, at 
43. 
 45. Ben-Elia, Government Finance, supra note 43, at 19. 
 46. Ben-Elia, The Fourth Generation, supra note 27, at 44. 
 47. Only in 1997 did the grants return to their level in the 1980s in real terms, but 
even then the amounts did not compensate for the massive population growth in the 
local sector. See id.  
 48. THE KNESSET RESEARCH CENTER, ANALYSIS OF GENERAL GRANTS TO LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 1 (2010) (Isr.), http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m02620.pdf. 
 49. See, e.g., Eran Razin & Nir Brender, Local Government Reform: Decentrali-
zation to the Fit and Assistance to the Weak (Working Paper Caesarea Forum 2004), 
http://www1.idc.ac.il:549/2004/37674.pdf.  
 50. The Financial Arrangements Law, 1992, SH No. 1406 §§ 7–20 (Isr.).  
 51. See Bruno, supra note 26, at 388–89.  
 52. Razin, Impact of Decentralization, supra note 38, at 53. 
 53. See id. 
 54. The Financial Arrangements Law, 1992, SH No. 1406 §§ 7–20 (Isr.).  
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and maximum property tax rates.55  If a locality wishes to exceed the 
maximum tax rate allowed by the ministers or if it wishes to give dis-
counts on the rates it usually charges, then it must ask for the minis-
ters’ permission.56  The ministers do not always give the requested 
permissions,57 and tax increases are not always sufficient to cover the 
local expenses.58 
It follows, therefore, that since the 1980s, three vectors, all pointing 
toward the direction of a local crisis, have acted simultaneously: first, 
the significant increase in local expenditures, second the decrease in 
intergovernmental transfers, and third the limitations on local taxa-
tion.  As a result of these changes, localities were unable to generate 
sufficient income to cover their expenses, and deficits were created.59  
In the twenty years from 1985 until 2005 municipal deficits grew larg-
er and larger.  Every year the municipal sector suffered deficits, which 
gradually accumulated to billions of shekels.60  The central govern-
ment did little to change this situation, and so the deficit reached un-
controllable proportions.61 
Arab municipalities particularly suffered.62 Arab localities in Israel 
are typically poor communities and have difficulty attracting large 
and profitable businesses.63  They also have difficulties collecting local 
taxes and rely on intergovernmental transfers to finance their expens-
 
 55. The property in each municipality is divided into several categories, such as 
residential buildings, agricultural areas, commercial areas, banks, insurance compa-
nies, and so on. The minimum and maximum tax rates are set separately for each cat-
egory. See The Regulation for the Financial Arrangements Law (Local Property 
Tax), 2007, KT 6549, p. 429 (Isr.). 
 56. The Financial Arrangements Law, 1992, SH No. 1406 §§ 7–20 (Isr.) (Statutory 
Amendments to Achieve Budgetary Goals). 
 57. See Raz Smollansky, 145 Local Governments Submitted a Request to In-
crease Property Tax Rates, MARKER (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.themarker.com/real 
estate/1.681287.    
 58. Meirav Arlozorov, Who Is to Blame for the Local Poverty?, THE MARKER 
(Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.themarker.com/misc/article-print-page/1.1614303 (quoting 
a source in the Ministry of Interior saying that even if localities exhausted all their 
property tax base, they still would reach a balanced budget). 
 59. Ben-Elia, Municipal Crisis, supra note 25, at 12; Dovrat Zilberstein, Local 
Governments’ Deficits 2 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://public-
policy.huji.ac.il/upload/taksiv.pdf.   
 60. Ben-Elia, Municipal Crisis, supra note 25, at 12; Zilberstein, supra note 59, at 
2.   
 61. Ben-Elia, Municipal Crisis, supra note 25, at 12; Zilberstein, supra note 59, at 
2. 
 62. See Jabareen, supra  note 24.   
 63. Id.  
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es.64  Consequently, when the state decreased the amount of general 
grants, these localities found themselves in an extremely difficult situ-
ation.65  In addition, even within the amounts the state does distrib-
ute, Arab localities do not get their fair share.66  Although the gap 
significantly decreased over the years, even today, the amounts an 
Arab locality receives from the central government are often smaller 
than the amounts received by a Jewish municipality with similar char-
acteristics.67  It is, therefore, not surprising that they were the most af-
fected by the local crisis. Some Arab localities, like Taibe or Arabea, 
reached a point where they literally stopped providing local services.68 
B. The Local Political Structure and Lack of State Monitoring 
Theoretically, the shrinkage in local revenues just described did not 
have to result in such huge deficits.  Local officials could have 
adapted the local expenditures to the actual income level and avoided 
excessive spending.  Most localities, though, did not conduct them-
selves in a fiscally responsible manner.  Although local officials un-
derstood the gravity of the situation, they maintained a high level of 
spending and chose to ignore the economic problems.69 
The reasons for the local officials’ fiscal irresponsibility were var-
ied.  In some cases the increased spending was the result of bad man-
agement skills,70 in some cases corruption,71 and yet in others it re-
sulted from an assumption that the state would eventually cover the 
 
 64. Id.  
 65. See id.  
 66. See id. 
 67. Eran Razin, Fiscal Disparities Between Arab and Jewish Local Authorities—
Is the Gap Narrowing? (Floersheimer Inst. For Pol’y Stud., Working Paper No. 1/38, 
1999) [hereinafter Razin, Fiscal Disparities]; Dan Ben David & Yuval Erez, Inequali-
ty in the Equalization Grants 2–7 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.tau.ac.il/~danib/israel/izun.pdf; Razin, Impact of Decentralization, supra 
note 38, at 66. 
 68. HCJ Appeal No. 4815/05, Israel vs. Local Council of Arabea (May 20, 2006) 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); DC Bankruptcy (TA) 2419/07 In re 
The Municipality of Taibe, A Special Report of the Trustee (Nov. 18, 2007) (Isr.) (on 
file with author).  
 69. Ben-Elia, Municipal Crisis, supra note 25, at 12–14.   
 70. See infra notes 204–23 and accompanying text.   
 71. Id.  
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local costs.72  In most cases, however, political circumstances within 
the locality drove the local officials to overspend.73 
Economic research shows that one of the most important causes 
for the creation of deficits, both in the national and sub-national lev-
els, is political fragmentation.74  The more fragmented a government 
is, the more likely it is to enter a fiscal crisis.75  The extent of political 
fragmentation is largely determined by the size of the local coalition, 
and by the number of social groups (constituencies) this coalition rep-
resents.76  The larger and the more politically diverse a coalition is, 
the more likely a deficit is to develop.77  The local crisis in Israel illus-
trates this point.  Especially since 1978, when direct elections to the 
 
 72. See David Dery, Fuzzy Control, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 191, 203 
(2002) [hereinafter Dery, Fuzzy Control].  
 73. AVI BEN BASSAT & MOMI DAHAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 60 (2009) [hereinafter BEN BASSAT & DAHAN, POLITICAL ECONOMY]. 
 74. John Ashworth et al., Government Weakness and Local Public Debt Devel-
opment in Flemish Municipalities, 12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 395, 395–96 (2005); Reza 
Baqir, Districting and Government Overspending, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1318, 1347 
(2002); Terje P. Hagen & Signy Irene Vabo, Political Characteristics, Institutional 
Procedures and Fiscal Performance: Panel Data Analysis of Norwegian Local Gov-
ernments 1991–1998, 44 EUR. J. POL. RES. 43, 43–44 (2005); Guntram B. Wolff, Fiscal 
Crisis in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-Structural Causes, 6 ICFAI J. PUB. FIN. 7 
(2008). See also Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, Electoral Institutions, Cabi-
net Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union 3 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 6341, 1997); Roberto Perotti & Yianos Kontopoulos, 
Fragmented Fiscal Policy, 86 J. PUB. ECON. 191, 194 (2002); Roberto Ricciuti, Politi-
cal Fragmentation and Fiscal Outcomes, 118 PUB. CHOICE 365, 368–69 (2004); 
Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey D. Sachs, Political and Economic Determinants of Budget 
Deficits in the Industrial Democracies, 33 EUR. ECON. REV. 903, 922 (1989); Andres 
Velasco, Debt and Deficits with Fragmented Fiscal Policymaking, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 
105, 106–07 (2000). 
 75. See Perotti & Kontopoulos, supra note 74, at 193.   
 76. See id.  
 77. The intuition behind this observation derives from the well-known common 
pool problem. See Hallerberg & von Hagen, supra note 74, at 6; Wolff, supra note 74, 
at 10. The city’s budget can be viewed as a common resource controlled by the differ-
ent groups that comprise the city’s coalition. Due to the shared control of this com-
mon resource (the budget), each group within the coalition has an interest in increas-
ing its budgetary demands, because the group fully enjoys the utility of the demands 
it imposes, but the costs of those demands (and in particular the costs of a possible 
budgetary deficit) are shared with all other groups in the city. Since the various 
groups do not fully internalize the costs of their financial claims, as the number of 
groups increase, so do the budgetary pressures. In addition, in fragmented political 
environments interest groups play a dominant role. Interest group support is essential 
for both forming and sustaining the local coalition, and so politicians are more sus-
ceptible to the groups’ financial demands. See Wolff, supra note 74, at 9–17. For a 
more general account of interest group influence in politics, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, 
PUBLIC CHOICE III 475–97 (2003). 
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mayor’s position were implemented,78 local politics became increas-
ingly fragmented.79  The number of parties in local coalitions consid-
erably increased,80 and this in turn contributed to their irresponsible 
spending.81 
According to research conducted by Avi Ben Bassat and Momi 
Dahan,82 in 1978 there was an average of five parties competing for 
votes in every locality.  In contrast, in 2003, there was an average of 
ten parties.83  City councils have on average ten seats, and these seats 
are populated by no less than seven different parties.84  And just as 
the economic theory suggests, the fragmentation contributes to the 
creation of deficits.85  Each alderman seeks to maximize the budget-
ary benefits for his constituency, giving little attention to the general 
damage of overspending the municipal resources.86  The mayor, who 
needs the support of the city council to approve the budget, is forced 
to comply with the different interest groups’ demands, and deficits 
are created.87  Ben Bassat and Dahan demonstrate this point by ex-
amining the correlation between the size of the mayor’s party in the 
coalition and the locality’s accumulative deficit.88  They find that the 
ratio of a locality’s cumulative deficit and its income negatively corre-
lates to the relative power of the mayor’s party in the city’s coali-
tion.89  The smaller the mayor’s party is, the larger the deficit (in rela-
tion to the income).90 
These results are not unique to the Israeli political environment. 
Ample empirical evidence shows that when coalitions are comprised 
 
 78. For an analysis of the change in the election system and its consequences, see 
generally David Dery, Elected Mayors and De Facto Decentralization Israeli Style, 
24 LOC. GOV’T STUD. 45 (1998) [hereinafter Dery, Elected Mayors].  
 79. BEN BASSAT & DAHAN, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 73, at 59–60. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 43. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id, 
 89. Id. 
 90. According to the research, when members from the mayor’s party comprise 6 
to 15% of the council, the deficit to income ratio is 71%. See BEN BASSAT & DAHAN, 
POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 73, at 60. When members from the mayor’s party 
comprise 31 to 42% of the city council, the deficit to income ratio is 55%. Id. This 
negative correlation continues to hold even when controlling for other local charac-
teristics (such as size, socio-economic level and more). See id.  
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from representatives of multiple parties, politicians are driven to 
overspend.91  This, however, is where the state should come in.  The 
state should monitor the local fiscal affairs and prevent the local poli-
ticians from succumbing to local political pressures.  The state is not 
part of the local political arena, and as an outside supervisor it is able 
to force localities to behave in a fiscally responsible manner.92  In-
deed, the Israeli legal system vested in the Ministry of Interior various 
authorities to do exactly that.93  These authorities significantly im-
proved in 2004, but even before 2004, the Ministry had considerable 
powers.  It could review localities’ financial statements,94 approve (or 
disapprove) local budgets,95 authorize (or nullify) financial activities 
(such as taking loans, selling real estate, giving guarantees, et 
cetera),96 examine the function of certain local officials,97 and more.98  
In theory, these authorities could have enabled the Ministry to effi-
ciently supervise and limit local spending, but in practice the Minis-
try’s supervision was lacking. Although the state had meaningful 
monitoring authorities, it did not take advantage of its statutory ca-
pabilities. 
According to the state’s Comptroller report prepared in 2006, the 
Ministry of Interior failed to monitor local finances.99  The report ex-
amined localities’ financial practices from 2003 to 2005, and it shows 
that during this period, localities did not comply with the ministry’s 
regulations, and the Ministry did not discipline disobedient locali-
 
 91. See Ashworth et al., supra note 74, at 395–96; Baqir, supra note 74, at 1347; 
Hagen & Vabo, supra note 74, at 43–44; Hallerberg & von Hagen, supra note 74, at 9; 
Perotti & Kontopoulos, supra note 74, at 192, 194; Ricciuti, supra note 74, at 369; 
Roubini & Sachs, supra note 74, at 922; Velasco, supra note 74, at 105. 
 92. For the advantages of state monitoring of local fiscal affairs, see generally 
Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. 
L. REV. 633 (2008) [hereinafter Kimhi, Reviving Cities].  
 93. Zilberstein, supra note 59, at 5; SHALOM ZINGER, A PROPOSAL FOR LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT REFORM 267–93 (2003); BARAK CALEV, SUPERVISION AND AUDITING 
MECHANISMS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN ISRAEL (2009), available at 
http://spirit.tau.ac.il/government/downloads/BarakCalev.PDF.    
 94. Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 216 (Isr.). 
 95. Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 206 (Isr.). 
 96. Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, §§ 201, 202A, 212, 222 (Isr.). 
 97. Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 171 (Isr.). 
 98. See, e.g., Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 207 (Isr.) (discussing the 
minister’s ability to alter the local budget).  
 99. See also ISRAEL COMPTROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
2006: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND THE MINISTRY OF 
INTERIOR 38 (2007), available at http://www.mevaker.gov.il/serve/contentTree.asp? 
bookid=481&id=188&contentid=&parentcid=undefined&sw=1024&hw=698 [herein-
after ISRAEL COMPTROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT 2006].  
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ties.100  A good example is the approval of local budgets.  According 
to the Municipalities Ordinance, all localities need to submit their 
proposed budgets for the Ministry’s approval.101  The Ministry should 
approve the budget before January 1, the beginning of the fiscal year, 
and without such approval the municipality cannot work with the new 
budget.102  According to the Comptroller’s Annual Report of 2006, 
however, from 2003 to 2005 the Ministry of Interior did not approve 
even a single local budget by the statutory deadline of January 1.103  
Less than 20% of the local budgets were approved by September 30, 
and the majority of local governments operated without an approved 
budget for the entire year.104  Forty municipalities—16% of the total 
number—operated without an approved budget during all three years 
that the Comptroller examined.105  Moreover, according to the report, 
more than half of the municipalities whose budget was approved 
overspent their budget.106  The Ministry of Interior rarely sanctioned 
the defiant localities and in most cases, just approved the deviation 
retroactively.107  This of course raises doubts about whether the ap-
proval procedure was needed in the first place. 
One of the main reasons for the state’s feeble monitoring was simp-
ly a lack of personnel.  There was no correlation between the number 
of staff overseeing the local finances, and the scope of their tasks, and 
the shortage in human resources inevitably decreased the level of su-
pervision.108  Although the central government knew its monitoring 
staff was insufficient, it preferred to ignore the situation.109  It chose 
 
 100. Id.  
 101. Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 206 (Isr.). 
 102. Without an approved budget, the locality can spend one-twelfth of the previ-
ous year’s budget each month. See Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 206(e) 
(Isr.).  
 103. ISRAEL COMPTROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 99, at 49. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 40, 59. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 60; see also Zilberstein, supra note 59, at 4–5. According to the report, it 
took an average of 160 days for the Ministry of Interior to review a local budget, after 
the budget had been already submitted. See ISRAEL COMPTROLLER, ANNUAL RE-
PORT 2006, supra note 99, at 53. 
 109. The 2006 Comptroller report specifically states that the problem with the 
state’s supervision was known for many years, and that it was discussed in various re-
ports submitted to the government as early as 1981. See ISRAEL COMPTROLLER, AN-
NUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 99, at 53. 
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to invest state resources elsewhere, and the level of local monitoring 
remained unsatisfactory.110 
But the lack in personnel was not the only reason for the state’s 
omissions.  Often the Ministry of Interior was reluctant to use its 
monitoring tools, even when forcing compliance could have been 
done relatively cheaply.  A good example is the external auditors’ re-
ports.  As part of its supervisory duties, the Ministry of Interior ap-
points external auditors to localities.111  The auditors study the way 
the locality is managed and write a detailed report to the Ministry 
scrutinizing the local governance.112  Examining the auditors’ reports 
reveals an interesting phenomenon. In most municipalities the same 
critiques reappeared year after year.113  Even if the auditors’ com-
ments could have been easily corrected, the Ministry often chose to 
ignore them.114  It preferred to let sleeping dogs lie, and not to create 
a conflict with the locality unless a catastrophe occurred.115 
II.  THE PROBLEMS WITH STATE MONITORING 
From the foregoing description it appears as though Israel’s central 
government did not do much to prevent the local fiscal crisis.  It can 
even be said that the central government’s policies contributed to the 
creation of the crisis.  The state neglected the local sector, and al-
 
 110. The Comptroller report quotes a letter written by the head of one of the coun-
ties in the ministry of interior, emphasizing the need to hire more people to supervise 
the localities’ budgets. The quoted letter maintains that the money the state saves by 
not hiring a sufficient number of people actually costs dearly when local deficits are 
created. See id. at 60.  
 111. Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 214 (Isr.).    
 112. See Fundamental Principles and Guidelines in the Work of the Local Gov-
ernment Audit Department of The Ministry of Interior, http://www.moin.gov.il/Sub 
jects/LocalGovermentCriticism/Pages/About.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).  
 113. CALEV, supra note 93, at 33–36. Calev writes that the auditors put a small as-
terisk in their reports whenever a certain finding was also mentioned in the previous 
year’s report and was not corrected. He points out that the reports are filled with 
such asterisks.    
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 35–36. A good example is the submission of local budgets for the Minis-
try’s approval. According to the Comptroller’s report, local governments submitted 
the budgets an average of 148 days after the statutory deadline. See ISRAEL COMP-
TROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 99, at 50–52.  The Ministry did not insist 
on early submission, and did not sanction localities for the delay. On the contrary, 
although strictly prohibited by the Municipalities Ordinance, localities often worked 
with their non-approved proposed budget. See Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 
8, § 206. (Isr.). 
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lowed localities to reach a point where they could not efficiently pro-
vide public services. 
Such behavior by the state may seem puzzling.  Although the state 
delegates the responsibility for the provision of local public goods to 
localities, it is still ultimately responsible for its residents.  It is the 
state’s duty to assure that its residents will continue to receive essen-
tial services (such as waste disposal, welfare, education, or proper in-
frastructure), and it cannot shirk its duties by allowing municipalities 
to go bankrupt.  So why did the Israeli government, particularly the 
Ministries of Interior and Finance, allow such a massive local crisis to 
develop? 
The state’s conduct in this respect is particularly puzzling when we 
consider the efficiency with which Israel monitors its banking system 
and securities markets.  Israel has managed to create a relatively suc-
cessful supervision mechanism on its commercial banks.116  In face of 
the world’s credit crisis, the Israeli banking system remained relative-
ly stable.117  The International Institute of Management Development 
(IMD) at Lausanne, Switzerland ranked Israel first among fifty-eight 
states in economic soundness, and attributed much of the success to 
the tight supervision of the central bank.118  So if the state, through 
the Bank of Israel or the Securities Authority, can make sure that 
banks and insurance companies remain stable, shouldn’t it be able to 
do the same with local governments? 
In this Part, I argue that the reasons for the state’s failure in the 
monitoring of local finance are mainly political.  The nature of Israel’s 
political system did not provide the state’s politicians sufficient incen-
tives to invest state resources in the local sector or to effectively su-
pervise localities. To the contrary, in some respects, state politicians 
benefited from the local sector’s weakness. Localities were forced to 
come to the state for assistance, and the state politicians were em-
powered by the localities’ dependency on the state. 
 
 116. See Avital Lahav, S&P Upgrades Israel’s Credit Rating, YNET NEWS (Sept. 9, 
2011), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4120069,00.html (noting that the 
rating agency cites Israel’s “strong institutions” among the reasons for the recent up-
grade); Adi Ben-Israel, Israel Tackled Global Crisis Best—Survey, GLOBES (May 20, 
2010), http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000560890&fid=172 
5.   
 117. See Lahav, supra note 116.   
 118. See Ben-Israel, supra note 116. 
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A. The Costs (or Lack Thereof) of a Local Crisis to the State 
Politician 
In the end of the 1970s, in a series of papers, Geoffrey Brennan and 
James Buchanan posited a theory often referred to as the “Leviathan 
Hypothesis.”119  This hypothesis draws an analogy between a mono-
lithic government and a private monopoly.120  Just as a private mo-
nopoly seeks to maximize profits, the hypothesis maintains, a central 
government aims to maximize tax revenues.121  The government aims 
to grow and spend, and it exploits its residents by increasing its tax 
rates.122  To constrain the central government’s behavior, Brennan 
and Buchanan suggested a decentralization policy.123  Since individu-
als and firms in the sub-national level are mobile, they argued, decen-
tralization will force local governments to engage in tax competi-
tion.124  Local governments will be compelled to be smaller and more 
efficient, because they wish to lure tax-paying residents to their terri-
tory.125 
The Leviathan Hypothesis was empirically tested with inconclusive 
results.126  Several economists, therefore, questioned the hypothesis, 
and showed that decentralization can also produce negative conse-
quences.127  This strand of literature focuses on the common pool 
 
 119. See generally GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO 
TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION (1980) [hereinafter 
BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX]; Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchan-
an, Tax Instruments as Constraints on Disposition of Public Revenues, 9 J. PUB. 
ECON. 301 (1978); Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, Towards a Tax Constitu-
tion for Leviathan, 8 J. PUB. ECON. 255 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan & Buchanan, 
Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan]. 
 120. BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX, supra note 119, at 15. 
 121. See Brennan & Buchanan, Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan, supra 
note 119, at 258 & n.6. 
 122. See id.  
 123. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX, supra note 119, at 185 
(“Total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, 
the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized.”). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. at 171–73. 
 126. Some studies approved the theory. See, e.g., Silika Prohl & Friedrich Schnei-
der, Does Decentralization Reduce Government Size? A Quantitative Study of The 
Decentralization Hypothesis, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 639, 659 (2009). While others found 
zero or even a negative connection between decentralization and government size. 
See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study, 75 AM. 
ECON. REV. 748, 756 (1985); Ernesto Stein, Fiscal Decentralization and Government 
Size in Latin American Countries, 2 J. APPLIED ECON. 357, 365 (1999).  
 127. Luiz R. De Mello Jr., Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations: A Cross Country Analysis, 28 WORLD DEV. 365, 373–74 (2000); Jonathan 
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problem created if intergovernmental grants finance decentraliza-
tion.128  When the central government’s funds are shared among the 
different localities, then each locality attempts to maximize the cen-
tral financing.129  Localities have an incentive to overspend their rev-
enues, in expectation that the central government will come to their 
rescue and pay their debts.130  Decentralization, therefore, can lead to 
growing governmental expenditures, rather than efficiency or down-
sizing.131  In support of these claims, studies show that in certain cases, 
such as in Norway or in Latin American countries, decentralization 
led to an increase in total governmental spending.132 
Israel’s decentralization, however, fits neither the Leviathan hy-
pothesis nor the common pool paradigm.  On the one hand, contrary 
to the Leviathan hypothesis, the decentralization resulted in the 
growth of local expenditures.133  Localities were assigned with more 
and more responsibilities, and there was little competition for effi-
ciency among them.134  On the other hand, intergovernmental trans-
fers decreased.135  The state’s politicians were unwilling to overuse the 
state’s budget, and they dried the local revenue sources—both trans-
ferred and independent.136  Thus, although decentralization inflated 
public spending, contrary to the predictions of the common pool par-
adigm, the central government did not bear the increased costs.  Lo-
calities had to carry much of the extra burden themselves, and with 
insufficient resources a local crisis was bound to develop. 
The reason for Israel’s behavior lies in its political system.  In coun-
tries that invest significant central resources in the local sector, like 
Norway, state politicians are usually rewarded for their support.137  
State politicians have an interest in transferring state funds to locali-
 
Rodden, Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government, 57 
INT’L ORG. 695, 724 (2003); Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, Vertical Imbalance 
in the Canadian Federation 8 (July 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://http-server.carleton.ca/~winers/papers/VFI-Revised-July2-10.pdf. 
 128. De Mello Jr., supra note 127, at 367; Rodden, supra note 127, at 695–99. 
 129. See De Mello Jr., supra note 127, at 368; Rodden, supra note 127, at 704–05. 
 130. De Mello Jr., supra note 127, at 367. 
 131. Lars-Erik Borge & John Rattso, Spending Growth With Vertical Fiscal Im-
balance: Decentralized Government Spending in Norway 1880–1990, 14 ECON. & 
POL. 351, 351 (2002); Stein, supra note 126, at 363–66. 
 132. See, e.g., Borge & Rattso, supra note 131, at 6.  
 133. See supra notes 25–68 and accompanying text. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id.  
 136. See id. 
 137. See Borge & Rattso, supra note 131, at 6. 
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ties because they gain political benefits as a result.138  In Israel, how-
ever, this assumption does not hold true.  Investing in the local sector 
in Israel does not seem to be politically worthwhile, because residents 
do not inflict retribution on state politicians for their local policies. 
First, Israel’s national electoral system is based exclusively on na-
tion-wide proportional representation.139  There are no electoral dis-
tricts, and the number of seats each party receives in the Knesset is 
proportional to the number of voters who voted for it all over the 
country.140 Consequently, regional constituencies do not play a signif-
icant role in national politics.  State politicians do not feel obligated 
to a narrow geographical constituency, and the different constituen-
cies are usually divided by ethnic or religious affiliations.  Politicians 
feel committed to their national sector (ultra-orthodox, ethnic minori-
ties, agriculture, et cetera), but not to a certain locality or county.141 
Second, due to ever-urgent security issues, local issues play a small 
role in the national elections.142  Voters will usually vote for the party 
that best represents their views with regard to national security (as in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), and local affairs do not receive con-
siderable attention.143  As Razin points out, voters in Israel are not 
particularly interested in the local government system.144  They do not 
consider local policies to be very important, and so the state’s actions 
in this area often go unrewarded or unpunished.145 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the fiscal relations between 
the state and local spheres are so complex that residents do not al-
ways understand the state’s fiscal policies toward the municipal sec-
tor.146  There is no code or clear set of rules that defines the scope of 
 
 138. Rodden, supra note 127, at 707; Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Does 
Centralization Increase the Size of Government?, 38 EURO. ECON. REV. 765, 770–73 
(1994). 
 139. See The Electoral System in Israel, KNESSET, http://www.knesset.gov.il/ 
description/eng/eng_mimshal_beh.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Cf. Eran Razin, Needs and Impediments for Local Government Reform: Les-
sons from Israel, 26 J. URB. AFFS. 623, 635 (2004) [hereinafter Razin, Needs and Im-
pediments] (arguing that “lack of ethno-religious homogeneity hampered the imple-
mentation of territorial reform, particularly when the suggested reforms are 
interpreted as influencing inter-ethnic relations.”).   
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 634. 
 146. Edward Zelinsky used the same line of reasoning to explain the phenomenon 
of unfunded mandates in the United States. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded 
Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public 
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responsibility of each level of government,147 and residents are often 
not aware of the state’s and localities’ respective responsibilities, even 
in areas as important as education, welfare, or infrastructure.148  The 
financing of many services is part local and part central, with informal 
formulas that determine the contribution of each level.149  Even ex-
perts have difficulty understanding how and why funding arrange-
ments are determined, let alone an average resident in a locality.150  
State politicians, therefore, can increase local costs, impose mandates, 
or cut state funding in ways that the general public usually will be un-
able to observe. 
As a result of these reasons, the central government’s accountabil-
ity towards the municipal sector decreases.  State politicians know 
that their local policies have little effect on the outcome of the na-
tional elections, so they pay little attention to localities’ financial con-
dition.  They prefer to spend the state’s funds in places that would 
bring them electoral benefits (for example, on the ultra-orthodox sec-
tor), rather than investing them in local fiscal health.151 
 
Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355 (1993). Zelinsky argues that un-
funded mandates allow federal and state politicians to take political credit for the 
benefits of regulatory mandates, while shifting the blame for the costs of these man-
dates to the local level. Id. at 1366 n.41.  Central to Zelinsky’s argument is the as-
sumption that voters are not able to correctly assign the responsibility for costs of the 
mandates. They credit the state or federal officials for their benefits, but erroneously 
blame local officials for the costs. See id. at 1386 n.80.  
 147. The Municipalities Ordinance details local governments’ duties and authori-
ties, but the statutory list is by no means exhaustive. The law does not include some 
of the more important local duties, and does not explain the role of the state. See 
Nahum Ben-Elia, Core Local Services: Expanding the Public Responsibility of the 
Ministry of Interior 12 (Floersheimer Inst. For Pol’y Stud., Working Paper No. 1/58, 
2006) (Isr.) [hereinafter Ben-Elia, Core Local Services].   
 148. Many services are provided by local governments merely as sub-contractors of 
the central government. The central government is statutorily responsible for the ser-
vices, but it uses localities as the actual providers. See id. at 9–10.   
 149. See id. at 10. 
 150. Arie Hecht, Restructuring Municipal Finance in Israel (Floersheimer Inst. For 
Pol’y Stud., Working Paper No. 1/13, 1997) (Isr.) (describing the intricate funding sys-
tem between the different central government ministries and the local government). 
 151. See Dery, Elected Mayors, supra note 78, at 45–46 (describing the relation-
ship between the local and central governments in Israel as follows: “[t]he relation-
ship between central and local government in Israel is fraught with crises and emer-
gencies. Financial crises in particular have become a matter of routine in the past two 
decades, often accompanied by strikes, mass demonstrations and other forms of pres-
sure politics . . . . Rather than reform the system, the government of Israel has con-
sistently shown preference for an ad hoc coping strategy, retaining the traditional 
‘agency’ model, whereby local authorities are seen as an administrative arm or sub-
contractor of central government . . . .”). 
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This is particularly severe in times of national economic difficulty.  
During a national recession, state politicians confront strict state 
budget limitations.152  They are expected to cut costs and might face 
political consequences if they fail to do so.153  Under these circum-
stances, from a state politician’s perspective, shifting costs to the local 
government level is a convenient solution.  The costs of the central 
government are reduced, but with a relatively small political price.154  
The Israeli experience demonstrates this point well. When faced with 
economic or social difficulties, the Israeli central government shifted 
the problem to the local level.155  This was the reason for the massive 
growth in local expenditure since the 1980s and for the dramatic cuts 
in intergovernmental transfers in 1986 and 2003.156 
 
 152. BEN BASSAT & DAHAN, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 73, at 67. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 67. This cost shifting phenomenon is not unique to Israel. According to 
research conducted for the OECD, when faced with hard budgetary constraints cen-
tral governments often shift costs to lower levels of governments. See Isabelle 
Joumard & Per Mathis Kongsrud, Fiscal Relations Across Government Levels 17 
(OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 375, 2003), available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/fiscal-relations-across-government-levels_455513871742 
(“While changes in fiscal balances since the early 1990s indicate that central govern-
ments have contributed most to fiscal consolidation, cuts have often been effected by 
devolving spending responsibilities to lower levels of government without providing 
commensurate financial resources. Central government grants to sub-national gov-
ernments have also sometimes been reduced.”); see also Robin Boadway & Jean 
Francois Tremblay, A Theory of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 1 (Queen’s Econ. Dep’t, 
Working Paper No. 1072, 2006) (arguing that there are cases where the central gov-
ernment takes advantage of its lead financial role, and does not transfer sufficient 
funds to local authorities). Boadway and Tremblay give the Canadian example: 
For example, in Canada, the case with which we are most familiar, there has 
been much debate about a so-called “vertical fiscal imbalance” that has 
emerged in recent years. The argument has been that the federal govern-
ment’s fiscal response to its structural deficit and debt problems that built 
up over the 1980s has been a disproportionate reduction in transfers to the 
provinces, effectively passing on some of its deficit to the latter. 
See id. at 1. 
 155. See  supra notes 25–61 and accompanying text.  
 156. See BEN BASSAT & DAHAN, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 73, at 68. Adi 
Eldar, the former chairman of the Union of Local Authorities, expressed the same 
view in a conference held in 2008 about the local crisis.  Eldar maintained that the 
crisis stemmed from budget cuts and unfunded mandates imposed on local govern-
ments. He explained that whenever the local leadership attempted to confront the 
government about this, journalists on behalf of the ministry of finance wrote newspa-
per articles on how corrupt mayors are. Local governments were not given sufficient 
resources to fund all the activities mandated by the state, but mayors were still 
blamed for lack of management skills. See Adi Eldar, Address at Caesarea Economic 
Policy Planning Forum (2008), available at http://www.idi.org.il/events1/CaesareaFor 
um/Pages/Forum_2008_B_Rashuyot_1.aspx.  
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Moreover, due to the lack of accountability, state politicians were 
able to use the state’s authorities towards the local sector as a political 
tool.  They created local dependency on the state so as to increase 
their own powers vis-à-vis the local leadership.  Dery and Schwartz-
Milner, for example, argue that the Ministry of Finance deliberately 
underfunded the municipal sector to get better control over local af-
fairs.157  The central government did not give localities the resources it 
knew they needed to properly finance their responsibilities, and 
thereby forced them to beg constantly for assistance.158  Itzhak Yaron, 
the former mayor of Givatayim, explained this point in a mayors’ con-
ference in 1992: 
The ministry of finance and the ministry of interior torture us . . . but 
they also know how to play with us. Together we can protest and 
shout: “we won’t let you! we won’t let you!,” but then individually, 
every one of us tries to get a few shekels for class rooms, or tries to 
get the minister’s signature on a loan he wants to borrow . . . togeth-
er everybody shouts “we won’t let you!,” but then each one of us se-
cretly approaches the minister and says—“Look, Deri (Arie Deri—
then the minister of interior—O.K), I need to talk with you for a 
minute.” This is our weakness.159 
State politicians, then, could use their power to give funds to locali-
ties whose leadership is more powerful and politically influential.  
Although generally the local sector was underfunded, specific locali-
ties—usually those with strong and connected local leaderships—
were able to get more funds.  Research conducted by Gershon 
Alperovich demonstrates the effects of political considerations on the 
 
 157. DAVID DERY & BINAT SCHWARTZ-MILNER, WHO CONTROLS THE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT? 63–64 (1994); Eran Razin, Local Government Reform in Israel, Be-
tween Centralization and Decentralization, Between Tradition and Modernity 68 
(Floersheimer Inst. For Pol’y Stud., Working Paper No. 1/48, 2003) (Isr.) [hereinafter 
Razin, Local Government]. Dery and Schwartz-Milner explain that in many cases 
there was no clear statutory mandate imposed on localities or an obvious reduction in 
financing. The central government simply failed to take responsibility for various ac-
tivities, and it left localities to cope on their own. Particularly enlightening is Dery 
and Schwartz-Miller’s discussion of the immigration wave that came to Israel in the 
1990s from the former soviet-union. Faced with a massive population growth, the 
central government adopted no overarching policy. The local governments had to ab-
sorb about a million new immigrants in a period of a few years (an increase of about 
a fifth of the population), and independently faced the educational, welfare, and em-
ployment challenges this immigration posed. The Ministry of Finance was reluctant 
to increase intergovernmental transfers, preferring to keep the funds in the central 
government’s pockets. See DERY & SCHWARTZ-MILNER, supra at 19–21. 
 158. DERY & SCHWARTZ-MILNER, supra note 157, at 63–64.  
 159. Id. at 57. 
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distribution of general intergovernmental grants.160  Alperovich ex-
amined the grant allocations to local governments under two different 
governments: Labor and Likud, and he evaluated the motivations be-
hind the amounts distributed.161  His research shows that central gov-
ernments reward their supporters.162  Labor governments gave per 
capita more grants to cities with predominantly labor voters, and 
Likud governments gave per capita more funds to cities that support 
the Likud.163  Naturally, municipalities that are not associated with 
any of the ruling parties, in particular Arab municipalities, suffer from 
continuous discrimination.164 
Another manifestation of the political interests underlying the 
state’s funding is provided by Avi Ben Bassat and Momi Dahan. Ben 
Bassat and Dahan show that specific grants (grants designed to fi-
nance specific state services provided by local governments) are dis-
tributed regressively rather than progressively.165  Affluent localities, 
that have the ability to raise more local taxes, receive higher specific 
grants than poor municipalities that need the funds much more.166  In 
education, for example, in 2005, the poorest localities got 2455 shek-
els per student, whereas the richest localities received 4147 shekels.167  
The same is true for welfare.  In 2005, municipalities in the top decile 
(in terms of socio-economic strength) received a state grant of 3522 
shekels per welfare patient as compared to only 869 shekels that pa-
tients in municipalities in the last decile received.168 Clearly, if a per-
son is in need of welfare, he should reside in an affluent locality. Af-
fluent localities are more politically powerful and attract more 
funding. 
The state’s lax monitoring of local finance can also be seen as a po-
litical tool.  The state created a situation where multiple financial and 
regulatory requirements are in place, but there are not enough re-
 
 160. See generally Gershon Alperovich, The Economics of Choice in the Alloca-
tion of Intergovernmental Grants to Local Authorities, 44 PUB. CHOICE 285 (1984). 
 161. Id. at 286. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at 293. 
 164. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. 
 165. AVI BEN BASSAT & MOMI DAHAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT CRISIS: EFFICIENCY 
VS. REPRESENTABILITY  15 (2008), available at http://www.idi.org.il/PublicationsCata 
log/Documents/BOOK_RASHUIOT/Rashuiot_For%20Press.pdf [hereinafter BEN 
BASSAT & DAHAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT CRISIS]. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 16. 
 168. BEN BASSAT & DAHAN, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 73, at 40–41.  
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sources to force compliance.169  Only a handful of bureaucrats are as-
signed to monitor local finance, which clearly is not enough to control 
the behavior of more than 250 localities effectively.170  Thus, although 
the local financial practices are formally regulated, their enforcement 
is selective and discretionary.171  There is a great tolerance for disobe-
dience, and silent understandings replace the strict and rigid require-
ments.172  This type of vague system, which Dery refers to as “fuzzy 
control,” empowers the central government’s officials.173  The state 
enjoys a wide range of flexibility in the enforcement of the rules, and 
the state bureaucrats and politicians decide on whom the rules will be 
strictly applied and who will enjoy the central government’s good 
graces.174  State officials are able to engage in informal discriminatory 
treatment and favor certain localities over others.175 
The appointment of internal auditors provides a good example.  
According to the municipal ordinance, all local governments are 
compelled to appoint an internal auditor.176  If the locality does not 
appoint an auditor after a certain period of time, the Ministry of Inte-
rior can appoint one for it.177  The Ministry, however, did not strictly 
enforce the statutory obligation. In the last decade, eleven localities 
operated for years without an internal auditor, but the Ministry did 
nothing.178  The Ministry knew about the violation, but it preferred to 
look the other way.179  Despite severe local corruption, no sanction 
was taken, and the localities operated as if nothing was wrong.180  The 
situation changed only after a petition to the Israeli High Court of 
Justice was filed.181 
Such regulatory uncertainty, together with local financial weakness, 
creates a climate of local dependency.  Localities need the state for 
 
 169. See generally Dery, Fuzzy Control, supra note 72. 
 170. See id. at 207. 
 171. Id. at 201. 
 172. Id. at 209. 
 173. See id. at 207.  
 174. Id. at 211. 
 175. See id. at 210; see also Razin, Needs and Impediments, supra note 141, at 630. 
 176. Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 167(b) (Isr.). 
 177. Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 167A (Isr.).   
 178. Calev, supra note 93, at 36.  
 179. Id.  
 180. Ari Sirkin, A Petition to the High Court of Justice to Enforce the Appoint-
ment of Internal Auditors in Local Governments, NEWS1 (Apr. 12, 2005), http://www. 
news1.co.il/ArticlePrintVersion.aspx?docID=68342&subjectID=1. 
 181. HCJ 3582/05 (Jerusalem) Movement for Quality Gov’t in Israel v. The Mayor 
of Ohr Akiva, (July 11, 2010) Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
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additional funds and for favorable regulatory treatment, and state of-
ficials are the ones deciding whether and who will get such treatment.  
With relatively small political costs from local financial distress, state 
politicians have little incentive to change this situation.  They are bet-
ter off preserving the local sector’s weakness, thereby maintaining 
their own strength. 
B. The Political Costs of State Intervention 
Until now, I have argued that Israeli state politicians are reluctant 
to invest resources to assist distressed localities.  They do not bear the 
political costs associated with the urban plight, and they benefit from 
the local dependency.  This Section discusses the political costs asso-
ciated with the state’s monitoring.  I show that state officials are reluc-
tant to efficiently monitor local finances, because they do not want to 
confront the local leadership. 
The connections between local and national politics in Israel have 
significantly changed over the years.  Initially, during the 1950s and 
1960s, national parties, particularly the Labor party, dominated local 
politics.182  The leaders of the Labor party formed lists of nominees 
for local elections, and mayors could not have been elected without 
the party’s approval.183  Since the 1970s, however, the dominance of 
national parties gradually has decreased.184  This change is the result 
of two important developments that took place in the late 1970s.185  
First, in 1975, the Knesset reformed the local election system.186  
Mayors are elected directly by the residents, and party lists are less 
relevant to the mayors’ success.187  Second, within the national arena, 
the Labor Party lost its dominance and the Likud became the ruling 
party.188  The Likud used local governments as a strategic base for its 
 
 182. Ben-Elia, Policymaking, supra note 29, at 116.  
 183. Yishai Blank, The Location of the Local: Local Government Law, Decentrali-
zation and Territorial Inequality in Israel, 34 HEBREW UNIV. L. REV. 1, 66 (2004); 
Razin, Local Government, supra note 157, at 52–53. 
 184. Ben-Elia, Policymaking, supra note 29, at 116; Razin, Local Government, su-
pra note 157, at 75. 
 185. Ben-Elia, Policymaking, supra note 29, at 116. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Dery, Elected Mayors, supra note 78, at 46.   
 188. Ben-Elia, Policymaking, supra note 29, at 116. 
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national political development, and localities became one of the pil-
lars for its electoral success.189 
As a corollary to these changes, the relationship between local 
leadership and national politics has transformed.  Local leadership 
has strengthened, and mayors have become central figures not only in 
the local arena, but in the national political sphere as well.  Candi-
dates in the parties’ primary elections seek mayoral support, as the 
endorsement of influential mayors can bring them prestige, voters, 
and funds.190  Mayors serve as channels to the electoral base, and their 
operational capabilities can help candidates’ campaigns.191  The affili-
ation of a mayor to a national party is also perceived, not necessarily 
justifiably, as an indication of the party’s popularity.192  The mayor’s 
support signifies the support of his city residents, and national parties 
boast the number of mayors they have as party members.193  Thus, 
due to the mayor’s political strength, state politicians are reluctant to 
create conflicts with him.  Especially if a mayor is a member of a state 
politician’s party, a conflict may be politically costly and can damage 
the state politician’s career.  Politicians are better off forming allianc-
es with local leaders, rather than taking measures that may under-
mine their authority.194 
Note, though, that seeking the support of a mayor does not neces-
sarily mean maximizing the benefit of the mayor’s locality.  On the 
contrary, in many cases there is a severe agency problem between the 
mayor and the local residents, and advancing the mayor’s interests 
comes at the expense of the local community.  This is especially true 
with respect to the monitoring of local finance. 
 
 189. Id. at 116–17. The Likud nurtured the local leadership, and some of the local 
officials became central figures in the national levels (Knesset members and minis-
ters). See id. at 117. 
 190. Id. at 117. 
 191. See, e.g., Uri Blau, Shaul Mofaz’s Military Tactics to Take Over Kadima Par-
ty, MARKER (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/as-defense-
chief-mofaz-failed-to-declare-brother-s-arms-business-1.252129.  Blau quotes one of 
Mofaz’s supporters that describes Mofaz’s tactics to gain support in Kadima: “Mofaz 
works with mayors, even mayors that are not members of the Kadima party. He 
helped them with all sort of stuff before, and now they are helping him. They ask 
members of Kadima that reside in their city to vote for Mofaz.” Id. 
 192. DANA BLUNDER, THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE, THE REASONS FOR 
THE NATIONAL PARTIES’ DECLINE IN THE LOCAL POLITICS (2009), available at http:// 
www.idi.org.il/breakingnews/pages/breaking_the_news_82.aspx. 
 193. Id.; see also Mazal Mualem, Kadima and Likud Are Battling Over Mayors’ 
Support, HAARETZ (Aug. 31, 2006), http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/9/967198. 
 194. Razin, Needs and Impediments, supra note 141, at 635. 
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Residents, much like shareholders in commercial corporations, suf-
fer from collective action problems when it comes to monitoring their 
local officials.  Each resident enjoys only a fraction of the monitoring 
benefits, and so he has little incentive to invest the time and effort re-
quired to carry it out.195  Due to lax residential monitoring, mayors 
can easily exploit local budgets.  They can engage in corruption or 
poorly manage the locality, while the residents do little to discipline 
such behavior.  Moreover, financial policy is often biased in favor of 
small, concentrated interest groups.196  Interest groups are able to 
overcome the collective action problems from which residents gener-
ally suffer, and offer politicians significant political benefits.197  Espe-
cially in politically fragmented localities, mayors tend to comply with 
interest groups’ demands.198  They need the interest groups to sustain 
their coalitions and are willing to overspend local resources in their 
favor.199  Thus, deficits are created, but the general local community 
does not necessarily enjoy the benefits of the expenditures that creat-
ed those deficits.200 
It is precisely because residents have difficulties monitoring their 
officials that the state should serve as an additional supervisor.  The 
state needs to complement residents’ monitoring and prevent mayors 
from engaging in policies that are detrimental to the local community 
as a whole.  It should represent the interests of the general diffused 
public by making sure that the local fiscal policy is not geared toward 
the benefit of small groups or of the local politicians themselves.  A 
political alliance between the state and local politicians interferes 
with this task.  The state is unwilling to confront harmful mayors, so 
these mayors can continue to overspend to the detriment of the local 
residents.  The creation of deficits or regulatory incompliance goes 
unsanctioned at the local community’s expense. 
Israel’s central government’s policy demonstrates this point.  Alt-
hough the state had ample supervisory powers, it was reluctant to use 
them.201  It failed to examine local budgets, it overlooked budgetary 
 
 195. Clayton Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 939, 955 (2008). 
 196. See id. at 957. 
 197. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 9–16 (2d ed. 1971); George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 12 (1971). 
 198. Wolff, supra note 74, at 42. 
 199. Id. at 38. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See supra notes 69–115 and accompanying text.   
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deviations and it did not pay attention to the comments written in ex-
ternal auditors’ reports.202  Even when the Ministry knew about a lo-
cality’s non-compliance with the Ministry’s own regulations, it often 
preferred to ignore it, so as not to confront the disobeying locality’s 
leadership.203  This response was especially problematic when the 
Ministry had to intervene in local affairs and remove the incumbent 
mayor and councilmen from their post. In these cases, political con-
siderations played a major role, and the Ministry often disregarded its 
supervisory duties.  The city of Lod provides an excellent example. 
Lod, a city in the center of Israel, had suffered for years from grave 
financial difficulties.  It incurred huge budget deficits, it failed to pro-
vide basic services to its residents, and it suffered from high crime 
rates.204  As a result of its economic condition, in 2004, the general 
manager of the Ministry of Interior appointed an investigation com-
mittee for the city.205  The committee looked into Lod’s financial situ-
ation and examined whether the state’s intervention was required.206  
The committee’s conclusions were unequivocal.  The city’s financial 
condition was atrocious, and its local officials were unable to change 
it.207  The committee therefore recommended the removal of the in-
cumbent leadership and the appointment of a state financial control 
board.208  The Ministry of Interior, however, decided to reject the 
recommendations.209  Benny Regev, Lod’s mayor at the time, was a 
very influential member in the Likud.210  Prime Minister Sharon, as 
well as other Likud members, insisted he should stay in office, and 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Calev, supra note 93, at 36. 
 204. ISRAEL COMPTROLLER, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 21, at 119. 
 205. Id.  
 206. According to the Municipalities Ordinance, the appointment of an investiga-
tion committee is the first step in the establishment of a state financial control board. 
The investigation committee examines the local economic condition, and determines 
whether the locality’s incumbent leadership can continue to manage the city or 
whether the state’s outside intervention is required. The committee hands its recom-
mendation to the Minister of Interior, who in turn decides whether to accept or reject 
the committee’s recommendation. See Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 143 
(Isr.). 
 207. One of the committee’s findings was that the city’s councilmen owed the mu-
nicipality 4.5 million shekels in property taxes. The municipality did not do anything 
to collect the debt, and it did not take any sanctions against the indebted councilmen. 
See Hanna Kim, The Disengagement Plan and Omri Sharon’s Cup of Coffee, 
HAARETZ (Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.haaretz.co.il/No=406306 (on file with author).   
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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they pressured the Minister of Interior not to use his authority.211  
The Minister of Interior gave in to the political pressure and decided 
to keep Regev in office.212 
As time passed, though, Lod’s financial condition only got worse.  
Notwithstanding the central government’s promises to help the city, 
Lod was unable to implement a successful rehabilitation plan.213  The 
city’s deficit grew at an alarming rate, while the level of services de-
clined.214  In March 2006, as the city’s financial condition kept deteri-
orating, the city’s residents petitioned to the High Court of Justice.215  
The residents asked the court to order the Minister to dismiss Regev 
and to appoint a financial control board instead.216  Even after the pe-
tition, though, Ehud Olmert, then the head of Kadima who was in 
charge of the Ministry of Interior, refused to discharge Regev.217  He 
was Regev’s political ally and owed him for supporting Kadima in the 
national elections.218  The fact that Regev was accused of corruption 
and had been indicted for taking bribes also did not convince Olmert 
to change his decision.219 
In October 2006, perhaps due to the fact that Regev was no longer 
a political asset,220 a newly appointed Minister of Interior eventually 
agreed to erect an additional investigation committee.221  The com-
 
 211. Sharon Kedmi, Sharon Instructed the Minister of Interior to Avoid Establish-
ing a Financial Control Board to Replace Lod’s Municipal Officials, GLOBES (Mar. 
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 221. Id. 
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mittee recommended Regev and the Councilmen’s removal,222 and in 
February 2007, the Minister accepted the recommendations.223  If the 
Ministry had supervised Lod’s finances properly, though, Lod’s resi-
dents would have been spared three years of poor management and 
corruption. 
Although Lod’s case is extreme, it exposes the tension between the 
Minister of Interior’s role as the monitor of local finances and his role 
as a politician.  As a monitor of local finance, the Minister of Interior 
should weigh only professional considerations.  He should examine 
how the locality’s incumbent leadership functions and whether the lo-
cality’s fiscal status warrants the state’s involvement.  As a politician, 
the Minister of Interior considers whether his actions are likely to 
promote his chances for re-election.  He aims to promote his political 
interests rather than the benefit of the distressed locality or the public 
as a whole.  Within this conflict, it is not clear who triumphs—the 
monitor or the politician. 
This tension was also at the center of the High Court of Justice’s 
decision in Assaraf v. Minister of Interior.224  In this case, the Minister 
of Interior, Meir Shitrit, removed the mayor of Ofakim, Avi Assaraf, 
from office.225  The Minister’s decision was based on the recommen-
dation of a special investigation committee, and followed ministry 
economists’ advice, but Assaraf still petitioned to the court in an at-
tempt to void it.226  Shitrit was a member of the Kadima party, where-
as Assaraf was a member of the Likud.227  A few months earlier, be-
fore the local elections and before Shitrit was appointed to minister, 
Shitrit publicly endorsed Kadima’s candidate for the mayor of 
Ofakim.228  He praised him and said that he would do anything in his 
power to promote his election.229  Assaraf argued that Shitrit removed 
him from office to fulfill the electoral promise he gave Kadima’s can-
 
 222. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE FOR CITY OF LOD: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007), available at http://www.moin.gov.il/SubjectDocu 
ments/Gvulot30.pdf. 
 223. Eli Senior & Miri Hasson, The Minister of Interior Removed Lod’s Mayor 
from Office, YNET (Feb. 4, 2007). 
 224.  See generally HCJ 7767/07 Avi Assaraf v. Minister of Interior (Jan. 27, 2008) 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).  
 225. Id. at ¶ 1. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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didate.230  He maintained that Shitrit’s interests were in conflict, and 
that his decision should be annulled.231 
The High Court of Justice accepted Assaraf’s argument.232  Not-
withstanding the committee’s and the economists’ opinions about 
Ofakim’s financial condition, the court determined that the Minister 
was precluded from exercising his statutory expelling powers.233  Ac-
cording to the court’s opinion, Shitrit’s public statement “upgraded” 
the level of his conflict of interest.234  It strengthened the tension be-
tween the Minister’s supervising authorities and his political agenda, 
and rendered the decision void.235  The court specifically stated that it 
did not base its decision on the fact that Shitrit and the incumbent 
mayor were from opposing parties (Kadima and Likud).236  Such ri-
valry is prevalent in Israel, and the court explained that denying the 
minister’s authorities in such cases would undermine the state’s su-
pervising ability.237  Rather, Shitrit’s public statement was the basis 
for the court’s decision.238 
The court’s reasoning, however, raises doubts.  It is not entirely 
clear why the public statement raises the level of conflict of interest, 
and why such utterance renders the minister incapable of exercising 
his legal authority.  A conflict of interest between the minister’s su-
pervisory and political roles exists whether the minister expresses the 
conflict in public or not. The statement does not strengthen or aggra-
vate the conflict—it simply brings it out in the open. 
The root of the problem lies in the fact that supervisors are politi-
cians.  Politicians pursue their political interests, whether they openly 
state it or not, and whether the relevant mayor is a political ally or 
foe.  The question we need to ask, therefore, is not whether the minis-
ter revealed his conflict of interest in public, but rather how we 
should structurally minimize the conflict from the outset.  What can 
we do to make the state’s monitoring less politically motivated? 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at ¶ 15. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at ¶ 15. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Id. at ¶ 14.  
 238. Id. at ¶ 15. 
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III.  LESSONS FROM THE ISRAELI CRISIS 
In a previous paper I wrote on the subject of municipal insolvency, 
I claimed that state intervention is the most effective response to a lo-
cal fiscal crisis.239  I argued that other potential remedies, such as 
mandamus to raise taxes or municipal bankruptcy, do not address the 
reasons for the local decline and cannot attain local rehabilitation.240  
At first glance, the Israeli experience seems to prove this theory 
wrong.  State monitoring was of little help in Israel, because political 
interests got in the way and rendered it ineffective.  So should the im-
portance of the state’s supervision of local finance be reevaluated? 
Notwithstanding the problems in the state’s supervision demon-
strated thus far, I believe that a general conclusion that diminishes the 
state’s role in local rehabilitation is mistaken.  Despite the evident 
drawbacks, state monitoring is central for local finance, especially at 
times when localities suffer from fiscal distress.241  The reason for this 
claim is that the problems distressed localities usually face cannot be 
addressed without the state.242  The problems are fundamental, and 
the state is the only entity with both legal authority and political pow-
er to initiate the required reforms to solve them.243 
Usually municipalities that enter a financial crisis suffer from two 
types of problems: socioeconomic and political.244  The socioeconomic 
problems have to do with external processes that decrease the city’s 
revenues or increase its costs.245  These processes are usually outside 
 
 239. Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 92, at 634.   
 240. Id. at 649–50, 653–54. 
 241. Id. at 641. 
 242. Id.  
 243. In a commercial context, we usually distinguish between financially and eco-
nomically distressed firms. A bankruptcy reorganization process is designed to help 
financially distressed firms—i.e. firms that suffer from liquidity problems. The bank-
ruptcy filing facilitates a capital reorganization, which decreases the firm’s debt bur-
den and helps it to overcome temporary liquidity hurdles. Bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion, however, does little to help economically distressed firms. Except decreasing the 
debt burden, bankruptcy offers no real rehabilitation process, and an economically 
distressed firm is better off liquidated. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Un-
contested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 580–81 (1998); Robert K. Rasmussen & David 
A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 85, 87–88 (1995). Municipal corporations usually suffer from economic 
distress. They reach insolvency due to fundamental socio-economic and political 
problems, and a bankruptcy reorganization process does not address those types of 
problems. See Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search 
of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351 (2010) [hereinafter Kimhi, Chapter 9]. 
 244. See Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 92, at 637–47. 
 245. Id. 
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the city’s realm of control, and they involve factors like the national 
economy (recession), population changes (suburbanization), or inter-
governmental relations (such as a decrease in grants or an increase in 
unfunded mandates).246  The political problems, on the other hand, 
are usually internal, and are associated with fragmentation.  The 
fragmentation increases the power of interest groups in the locality 
and weakens its fiscal discipline.247  State intervention is required to 
overcome both types of problems.  First, the state is better equipped 
than a locality to tackle the socioeconomic processes.  These process-
es require state or even nationwide solutions, and local officials can 
hardly tackle them on their own.248  Second, the state is able to reform 
the locality’s destructive political environment.  The state’s interven-
tion in local fiscal affairs centralizes the locality’s political environ-
ment, and centralization obligates the locality to exercise fiscal re-
straint.249  Such reforms require the state’s involvement, and an on-
going state supervision of local finances.250 
Indeed, even with respect to the Israeli crisis, it is hard to imagine 
how local recovery could have been achieved without the state’s in-
tervention.  As we saw earlier, the reasons for the Israeli crisis were 
the sharp decline in intergovernmental transfers, mounting expendi-
tures (a result of unfunded mandates), and the localities’ political 
fragmentation.251  The localities could not have independently solved 
these problems because they lacked the economic and political re-
sources to do so.  They needed the state’s involvement to increase 
funding and to change the political environment.252  It is true that 
 
 246. Id. at 638–42; see HELEN F. LADD & JOHN YINGER, AMERICA’S AILING CIT-
IES: FISCAL HEALTH AND THE DESIGN OF URBAN POLICY 291 (1989) (“As we measure 
it, a city’s fiscal health, standardized or actual, depends on economic, social, and insti-
tutional factors that are largely outside the city’s control.”); PEARL M. KAMER, CRISIS 
IN URBAN PUBLIC FINANCE: A CASE STUDY OF THIRTY EIGHT CITIES 25–55 (1983). 
 247. Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 92, at 642–47; see also BEN BASSAT & 
DAHAN, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 73, at 59–60.  
 248. Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 92, at 664–68. 
 249. Id. at 668–72. Theoretical and empirical studies show that a central authority, 
especially one with veto powers over the budget, can reduce the extent of political 
fragmentation and reduce deficits. See Baqir, supra note 74, at 1347–51. See also with 
regard to macroeconomic policy, Perotti & Kontopoulos, supra note 74, at 196–97; 
Hallenberg & Von Hagen, supra note 74, at 4–5; Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 
Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy 71–72 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. 
Working Paper No. 6329, 1997), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6329.pdf? 
new_window=1.  
 250. See Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 92, at 680–84 . 
 251. See supra notes 25–58 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 13–68 and accompanying text. 
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state policies contributed to the deterioration of the municipal sector, 
but by the same token, the solutions to the localities’ problems also 
had to come from the state.253 
If the state’s intervention is indeed necessary to maintain local fis-
cal health, we need to find ways to contain the political interests that 
stand in the way of efficient state supervision.  We need to find mech-
anisms that will help the state reach decisions based on the cities’ 
economic needs, and not on the political motives of state politicians.  
In this Section, I will discuss two such mechanisms.  The first is a mu-
nicipal bond market, and the second is a professional state body that 
will supervise local finance.  I believe the implementation of both 
mechanisms could have mitigated the scope of the local crisis experi-
enced by Israel, and can also assist other places. 
A. The Importance of Efficient Credit Markets 
The creditors’ contribution to the monitoring of commercial firms 
is well documented in corporate law literature.  The literature ex-
plains that the existence of debt reduces agency costs and contributes 
to the efficient management of the firm.254  Creditors monitor the 
corporate officials and make sure that the firm will be able to meet its 
debt obligations.255 
 
 253. Both in the United States and in Israel, localities that filed for bankruptcy 
without undergoing significant financial reforms returned to insolvency within a few 
years after the filing. The economic and political problems that were at the root of 
the insolvency were not solved, and the local fiscal condition quickly deteriorated 
again. This was the case, for example, with Macks Creek in the United States or with 
Taibe in Israel. See Kimhi, Chapter 9, supra note 243, at 381.  
 254. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Fi-
nance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).  Jensen explains that since the 
firm dedicates a certain portion of its cash flow to debt repayment, the amount avail-
able for spending at the discretion of the firm’s managers decreases. The managers 
have fewer resources to control, and, hence, agency costs decrease. 
 255. The creditors’ powers over the debtor can originate from different sources. 
Some creditors extend short-term credit, in which case, the debtor is forced to come 
back for additional funds in short intervals, and the creditors can refuse to loan or 
increase interest rates when the firm does not perform satisfactorily. See Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.  FIN. 737, 757 
(1997).  In other cases, usually when credit is extended for longer terms, creditors 
place restrictive covenants in the firm’s debt agreement. The covenants mandate a 
certain level of performance or prohibit certain types of behaviors, and to the extent 
the covenants are violated the creditors may gain control rights over the firm. See id; 
see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing 
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006); Clifford W. Smith, 
Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 
J. FIN. ECON. 117, 147–48 (1979). 
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As opposed to the ample literature on creditors of commercial cor-
porations, however, the literature on creditors of municipal corpora-
tions is relatively scarce.  Perhaps due to the democratic nature of lo-
cal governments, the literature usually emphasizes the monitoring 
that residents conduct, either through the political process or through 
the market for residence, and less on the creditors’ monitoring.  But 
just like with commercial corporations, creditors monitoring local 
governments may have positive effects on local fiscal health. 
Clayton Gillette explains that creditors’ monitoring can help solve 
some of the collective action problems from which the residents’ 
monitoring suffers.256  He notices that public monitoring is not neces-
sarily under supplied, but rather that it is mal-distributed.257  Some 
city functions are overly monitored by interest groups, while other 
functions, those with more diffuse effects, are overlooked.258  Gillette 
argues that under certain conditions the interests of the creditors and 
residents are sufficiently close, so that the creditors’ monitoring can 
compliment that of the residents.259  The creditors internalize, per-
haps even better than the residents, the potential consequences of the 
current local decisions.260  To avoid non-payment, they make sure that 
local officials will not jeopardize their interests and that the locality 
will not overspend its resources.261 
 
 256. Gillette, supra note 195, at 966.  
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 966.   
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 974.  
 261. There are, however, significant differences between commercial and munici-
pal creditors that render the creditors monitoring over municipalities much less effec-
tive. When a commercial firm defaults or breaches a contractual covenant, the credi-
tors can gain control rights over the firm or at least part of it. They can ask for the 
firm’s liquidation, foreclose some of its assets, or receive shares in lieu of debt pay-
ment. Shleifer & Vishney, supra note 255, at 757. The same is not true with regard to 
municipal creditors. Municipal creditors are unable to seize most of the locality’s as-
sets, and they cannot receive the shares of a defaulting city. The legal remedies avail-
able to them are extremely limited, because the control of the municipality always 
remains with the sovereign. See Capps v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 134 S.W. 808, 810 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1911); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: 
A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 429–34 
(1993).  Moreover, as explained earlier, a local fiscal crisis is often the result of cir-
cumstances that are beyond the local officials’ realm of control. The officials them-
selves cannot address the socio-economic causes that are at the root of the crisis, and 
political circumstances hinder them from cutting costs. In this situation, the financial 
creditors’ pressures to stop spending or to change the financial practices will do little 
good. The officials are very much the victims of a situation that requires a much wid-
er solution, and they cannot comply, even if they want to, with the creditors’ instruc-
tions. The creditors’ weakness in times of a fiscal crisis was evident in the New York 
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But on top of the creditors’ ongoing monitoring efforts, a municipal 
bond market has an additional benefit in times of a local fiscal crisis.  
At this point the market can serve as a channel through which the 
state politicians internalize the local crisis’ costs.  The state politicians 
often view the local crisis as a local event, and the markets can help 
render them more conscious to its wide-ranging implications. 
The markets view a local crisis not as an isolated event but rather 
as a warning sign for the condition of other localities.262  If a state al-
lows the default of one locality, other municipalities might suffer from 
similar problems and follow suit.263  The default, therefore, can in-
crease the price of credit for all public issuers in the state, even for 
those issuers that have no direct connection with the city’s default.264  
 
City crisis of 1975. In this case, when realizing the gravity of New York’s financial dif-
ficulties, the creditors organized a creditors group (the Financial Community Liaison 
Group—the FCLG). The group tried to pressure New York City’s officials to cut 
spending, but their efforts were in vain. They refused to extend the city any more 
credit, but they could not change the city’s financial practices. The problem was that 
the city’s officials were politically unable to implement the creditors’ suggested 
measures. The city’s rehabilitation required reforms, which neither the creditors nor 
the local officials could have implemented without the state’s help. For a more de-
tailed discussion of the FCLG, see ROBERT W. BAILEY, THE CRISIS REGIME: THE 
MAC, THE EFCB, AND THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE NEW YORK CITY FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 17–23 (1984). 
 262. See Kimhi, Chapter 9, supra note 243, at 382–83; see also Dennis Epple & 
Chester Spatt, State Restrictions on Local Debt: Their Role in Preventing Default, 29 
J. PUB. ECON. 199, 219 (1986). 
 263. Kimhi, Chapter 9, supra note 243, at 382–83; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Po-
litical Will and Fiscal Federalism in Municipal Bankruptcy 23–29 (NYU Sch. of Law 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-22, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1793173.   
 264. The contagion effects can stem from either malign or benign reasons. The ma-
lign reasons have to do with information gaps about the actual financial status of the 
different localities. Investors cannot easily differentiate between distressed and 
healthy localities, and so when one locality defaults they raise the interest rates for all 
localities. The benign reasons have to do with the pricing of state policies towards the 
local sector. States’ policies impact the financial condition of localities all over the 
state. States determine localities’ taxing powers, spending authorities, and debt limi-
tations, and their policies are usually directed to whole or parts of the municipal sec-
tor and not to a single isolated locality. Therefore, a default of one locality can reveal 
new information about the financial condition of other localities in the same state.  
The Orange County example is particularly interesting because at first glance, the 
county’s financial troubles seem unrelated to the financial situation of other local 
governments in the state. The bankruptcy occurred due to bad investments made by 
the County’s treasurer—investments made without the state’s approval and without 
proper financial disclosure.  A closer look at the circumstances surrounding the crisis 
however, does reveal a connection between the crisis and the state’s policies. The 
genesis of the Orange County Bankruptcy can be traced back to the approval of Cali-
fornia’s Proposition 13. See BALDSSARE, supra note 12, at 26. Proposition 13 imposed 
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The state itself can also suffer from the local default.  Creditors can 
view the default as a signal for the state’s economic condition and 
downgrade the state’s own credit rating.265 These contagion effects 
were evident in the Orange County bankruptcy.  Studies of the Coun-
ty’s bankruptcy show that it had adversely affected the entire munici-
pal bond market, and especially public issuers in California.266 
The contagion effects render the local crisis a state issue, rather 
than a local issue.  Because a local default may increase the interest 
rates paid by all local governments in the state, state politicians inter-
vene to prevent it.267  The intervention is not motivated by a concern 
for the efficient allocation of public goods in a specific distressed lo-
cality, but rather by the fear of the wide implications that a default of 
even one locality can trigger.268  House Representative Barney Frank 
explained this point in a Congressional hearing before the house 
committee on financial services: 
[L]et me just underline what’s been said. Several of us here were 
state legislators . . . and were mayors. Here is the point: no state—no 
state legislators, no governor, can allow any one of its municipalities 
to default because then every other municipality would pay through 
the nose. So that is why this is not just some charity here; this is self-
defense.269 
Governor Ed Rendell cited the same reasons for helping the city of 
Harrisburg avoid a default: “[w]e could not stand by and let the city 
default on these bonds.”270  Rendell added that Harrisburg’s default 
 
limits on property tax increases, and had a devastating effect on the local govern-
ments’ tax base. Id. This caused the County’s treasurer, as well as other local gov-
ernment officials, to invest in risky investments to make up for the lost revenues. Id.  
 265. Dwight V. Denison, Did the Bond Fund Investors Anticipate the Financial 
Crisis of Orange County?, 21 MUN. FIN. J. 24, 24–26 (2000); John M. Halstead et al., 
Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in Municipal Bond and Bank Equi-
ty Markets, 39 FIN. REV. 293, 313 (2004).  
 266. Denison, supra note 265, at 24–26; Halstead, supra note 265, at 313.  
 267. See infra notes 268–271 and accompanying text. 
 268. See Municipal Bond Turmoil: Impact on Cities, Towns, and States, Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 25 (2008) (statement of 
Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.). 
 269. Id.  
 270. See Dunstan McNichol, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Bond Default Averted 
with State Aid, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2010-09-12/harrisburg-pennyslvania-bond-default-is-averted-by-advance-on-state-
aid.html. 
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would boost borrowing costs or make credit unobtainable for other 
Pennsylvania municipalities and school districts.271 
Indeed, since the Great Depression, no local crisis in the United 
States has even resembled the one that Israel experienced.272  Local 
governments rarely default on the general obligation debt, and they 
have not failed to pay their employees for such long periods of 
time.273 
Note though that the state’s involvement does not necessarily have 
positive effects.  If the state just gives funds to localities to avoid a de-
fault (bailout), then the local expenditures are simply shifted from the 
locality’s residents to the state taxpayer.274  No net benefit is created, 
because the reasons that led to the local insolvency remain un-
changed.275  The bailout may even worsen the situation, as it incentiv-
izes localities to overspend, because localities know that the state will 
eventually pay for their inflated expenditures.276  If, however, the 
state’s involvement entails financial reforms, then local expenditure 
patterns can change.277  Not just a single default is prevented, but the 
locality, like other localities in the state, can enjoy better fiscal health 
in the long run.278  An efficient municipal credit market is able to 
price these different state strategies.279  Evidence shows that states 
that invest resources in an ongoing monitoring of local finance, rather 
 
 271. Id.; see also New York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of New 
York, ch. 868, § 1, 1975 N.Y. Laws 1405–07; Mike Williams, Around the South: 
Bankruptcy Not an Option in Solving Miami’s Fiscal Crisis, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 
17, 1996, at 18D (interviewing Lt. Gov. Buddy MacKay, then the head of Miami’s 
state oversight board, about the Miami fiscal crisis.  MacKay said: “Bankruptcy is not 
an option. That could have repercussions in the financial markets for the state and its 
other local governments as well.”). 
 272. See FITCH RATINGS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT GENERAL OBLIGATION RATING 
GUIDELINES 1 (2004) (“In the extreme, it is theoretically possible for a municipality 
to become so economically void, so that it does not have the financial means to repay 
debt. Fortunately, this circumstance has not existed since the Great Depression.”).   
 273. Michael McDonald, Meredith Whitney Loses Credibility as Muni Defaults 
Fall 60%, BLOOMBERG.COM (July 15, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
07-15/muni-default-plunge-belies-whitney-prediction-as-borrowers-shun-insolvency. 
html. 
 274. See Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for Enforcing Local 
Fiscal Discipline, 12 CONST. POL. ECON. 141, 142 (2001).  
 275. See id. at 142–43. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Kimhi, Reviving Cities, supra note 92, at 664–72. 
 278. Id.  
 279. Inman, supra note 274, at 155–56.  With regard to North Carolina, see Mayraj 
Fahim, North Carolina Still Influences U.S. Local Government Finance, CITY 
MAYORS (Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.citymayors.com/finance/nc_finance.html. 
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than just a bailout of insolvent localities, are rewarded by the credit 
markets.280  The creditors understand that the state policies make 
their loans to localities safer, and they are willing to charge lower in-
terest rates.281 
Israel, unfortunately, does not have an efficient municipal bond 
market.  Localities usually take credit only from banks, and there is 
no formal credit rating to evaluate the local financial condition.282  
The state is not affected in any way when a locality defaults, and it 
pays a small financial price for neglecting the municipal sector.  Ab-
sent significant contagion effects, the central government actually as-
sisted local governments to shift costs to the creditors.  In 2004, the 
Knesset enacted a statute that protected previously seizable assets 
from creditors’ reach.283  As a result of the legislation, creditors could 
not attach liens or foreclose funds that were deposited in special ac-
counts, and localities in a rehabilitation process could use these funds 
to finance their expenses.284 
This forced statutory arrangement was avoidable.  Despite the lo-
cal difficulties, the banks were willing to negotiate a voluntary debt 
readjustment plan, which would have included a consensual waiver of 
their execution rights.285  The Knesset and the local governments, 
however, refused.286  With no channel through which state officials in-
ternalized the costs of this cost-shifting to the creditors, they pre-
ferred an easy statutory solution over the implementation of hard and 
demanding reforms.  This way, the state did not need to increase state 
 
 280. See Inman, supra note 274, at 142. 
 281. See Richard Larkin & Jeff Schaub, State of North Carolina Local Govern-
ment Commission: Credit Enhancement Program Review, FITCH IBCA 1 (Mar. 29, 
1999), http://www.nira.or.jp/past/newsj/seisakuf/04/siryou/08.pdf. 
 282. Eliyahu Gabai, Encourage a Municipal Bond Market Rather than Spill Mon-
ey on Localities, HAARETZ, June 21, 2007 (reporting that until June 2007 only four 
localities issued municipal bonds); Tali Levy, The Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
Israel: The Development of a Bond Market Is Important to the Market in Order to 
Create Alternative Financing Sources to the Banking System, THE MARKER (Jan. 30, 
2006), http://www.themarker.com/misc/article-print-page/1.393493.    
 283. The Budget Foundations Act (Amend. No. 31), 2004, SH No. 1943 p. 402 
(Isr.).  
 284. See id. Despite the banks’ protests, the statute was implemented retroactively, 
so that even those creditors who had already acquired security rights or liens prior to 
the legislation could not exercise their rights. 
 285. Noam Sharvit, Banks Petitioned to the High Court of Justice Against the 
Statute that Enables Salary Payments to Local Government’s Employees, NEWS1 
(June 30, 2004), http://www.news1.co.il/Archive/001-D-49289-00.html. 
 286. Id. 
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funding or to intervene in local affairs contrary to the wishes of the 
local leadership. 
B. A Procedural Process for State Intervention 
The problem with state monitoring is not only that state politicians 
do not internalize the costs of a local crisis, but also that their deci-
sions are entangled with political considerations.  As the Israeli expe-
rience suggests, there is an inherent conflict of interest between the 
state’s monitoring role and state politicians’ personal interests.  Often 
personal interests get in the way of efficient monitoring.  To improve 
the state’s monitoring, we ought to untangle this conflict.  The super-
vision of local finance should be more professional and less politically 
motivated. 
The de-politicization of the state’s monitoring system can be pro-
moted by the implementation of administrative and procedural rules.  
These rules will limit the individual politician’s ability to take ad-
vantage of the state’s authorities, and will diminish the effect of per-
sonal political interests.287 Two principles are especially important in 
this respect: the legislation of ex-ante guidelines for the state’s super-
vision measures, and the creation of an insulated local government 
commission. 
One of the problems in the state’s monitoring is that the state’s in-
tervention measures usually take place only ex post.288  First, a certain 
locality fails to meet its financial obligations, and only then the state 
decides how to react and whether to intervene in the locality’s finan-
 
 287. Daphne Barak-Erez, The Role And Limits of Legal Regulation of Conflict of 
Interests (Part 1): The Administrative Process as a Domain of Conflicting Interests, 6 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 193, 201 (2005) (arguing that administrative decision-making 
should be understood as devoted to the balancing between conflicting interests of in-
dividuals or groups, usually when none of the affected parties has predefined legal 
rights that are relevant to the substantial content of the administrative decision).  
This situation is not unlike the regulation of conflicts of interests in commercial cor-
porations. Corporate boards are also required to follow certain procedural rules 
when faced with situations of conflict of interests, and the procedures are designed to 
mitigate agency costs. See, e.g., Scott V. Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special 
Committee—Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Man-
agement Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts 
of Interests, 43 BUS. LAW. 665 (1988).    
 288. Cf. Beth Walter Honadle, The States’ Role in U.S. Local Government Fiscal 
Crises: A Theoretical Model and Results of a National Survey, 26 INT’L J. PUB. AD-
MIN. 1431, 1461 (2003) (concluding from a survey of fifty U.S. states on their roles in 
local fiscal crises, that the states usually get involved only after the crises occur, and 
usually do not know about local crises beforehand; and that even when states do 
know of impending crises, they generally do not prevent them). 
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cial affairs. In the midst of the locality’s financial suffering, however, 
political pressures undermine the prospects of efficient state action.  
State politicians already know the mayor involved and whether it is 
politically advantageous to initiate a confrontation.  Interest groups in 
the city may have connections with the central government, and they 
too may lobby to prevent certain state measures.  The locality’s reli-
gious, ethnic, and political affiliations are known, and may also create 
biases when deciding on the state’s measures.  In short, when the state 
involves itself ex post, external considerations which have little to do 
with the locality’s economic condition can influence the state’s deci-
sions.289 
To lessen these political pressures, the state should create ex ante 
statutory guidelines for its intervention measures.290  The guidelines 
need to detail a series of financial indicators and specify how the state 
should respond when these indicators are triggered.291  The triggers 
for example, can be a deficit level, tax collection rates, or amounts of 
financial reserves, and the statute should specify the state’s supervi-
sion level when the different triggering events occur.292  For example, 
when the deficit reaches a 5% level, the state should appoint an ex-
ternal comptroller for the locality; when the deficit reaches a 10% 
level, it must appoint an oversight board; and at 15%, deficit or high-
 
 289. See Barak-Erez, supra note 287, at 200–01.   
 290. Anthony G. Cahill et al., State Government Responses to Municipal Fiscal 
Distress: A Brave New World for State-Local Intergovernmental Relations, 17 PUB. 
PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 253, 256 (1994). 
 291. See id. 
 292. Philip Kloha et al., Someone to Watch over Me—State Monitoring of Local 
Fiscal Conditions, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 236, 237 (2005) (surveying forty-eight 
states in the United States to examine whether they use financial indicators to evalu-
ate their localities’ fiscal condition). Kloha found that about a third of the states use 
such indicators, and on average, each state uses twelve different indicators. The au-
thors divided these indicators into eight different categories: Revenues (including per 
capita revenues, uncollected property tax revenues, and revenue shortfalls); Expendi-
tures (indicators such as: per capita expenditures, employees per capita, and fixed 
costs); Operating Position (including operating deficits, fund balances, and liquidity); 
Debt Ratios (including current liabilities, debt service, and any indicator that involves 
the locality’s inability to make payments when due); Unfunded Liabilities (pension 
liabilities and post-employment benefits); Legal or Technical Violations (including 
compliance with filing requirements, compliance with timing issues, compliance with 
accounting and auditing requirements); Community Needs and Resources (indicators 
such as: population changes, median age, personal income per capita, poverty house-
holds rate); Miscellaneous Category. Id. at 242. Each of these categories represents a 
factor that influences the local economy, and taken together, the different categories 
are able to monitor the changes in the local economy as a whole. For a somewhat dif-
ferent categorization, see generally SANFORD M. GROVES ET AL., EVALUATING FI-
NANCIAL CONDITION: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT (4th ed. 2003). 
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er, it can take over the locality’s finances altogether.  Some scholars 
have suggested the use of more sophisticated indicators.293  These in-
dicators use dynamic models, which compare the economic perfor-
mance of localities both over time and in comparison with other local-
ities.294  This facilitates the prediction of potential crises in the future, 
and allows for earlier and more efficient state action.295 
The advantages of such statutory guidelines are twofold. First, they 
are created behind a kind of “veil of ignorance.”296  At the time the 
guidelines are adopted it is still unknown which locality will enter fi-
nancial difficulties and will need the state’s assistance.  This approach 
induces politicians to consider the best interests of the local sector in 
general, and not of particular distressed municipality.  Second, the 
guidelines serve as a commitment device.  Since the guidelines pre-
scribe standards for the state’s behavior in cases of local financial 
emergencies, state politicians are more constrained in their actions.  
They should follow the statutory instructions and their individual po-
litical interests play a smaller role. 
To lessen the political pressures even further, the implementation 
of the guidelines should be left in the hands of an insulated profes-
sional state agency.  An insulated agency (a local government com-
mission) will minimize the politicization of the monitoring activities 
and will decrease pressure on the local leadership.297  Although the 
advantages of independent agencies have been widely debated in the 
literature,298  there are indications that when given certain institution-
al mechanisms, these agencies can diminish political influences.299 
 
 293. Ken W. Brown, The 10-Point Test of Financial Condition: Towards an Easy-
to-Use Assessment Tool for Smaller Cities, 9 GOV’T FIN. REV. 21 (1993).  
 294. Id. 
 295. See id.; Philip Kloha et al., Developing and Testing a Composite Model to 
Predict Local Fiscal Distress, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 313, 320 (2005).  
 296. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999).   
 297. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and 
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1207 (2000). 
 298. Independent agencies have been criticized from two main directions: constitu-
tional and functional. From a constitutional viewpoint, independent agencies violate 
the separation of powers. They blend the powers of all three branches of government, 
but are creatures of none. From a functional viewpoint the agencies are “organiza-
tionally dysfunctional.” See Susan Bertlett Foote, Independent Agencies Under At-
tack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988 DUKE L. J. 223, 223 
(1988). Since they have no clear lines of authority, they are politically unaccountable, 
and are therefore vulnerable to regulatory inefficiency and external manipulation. Id. 
See generally Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41 (1986). 
 299. See John M. Ackerman, Understanding Independent Accountability Agen-
cies, in COMP. ADMIN. L. 266–67 (Susan Rose Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010) 
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These institutional mechanisms are designed to facilitate greater po-
litical autonomy, decrease interest group pressure and improve the 
agency’s governance and legitimacy.300 
It is not within the scope of this Article to discuss the exact organi-
zational characteristics of a local government monitoring commission, 
but clearly the monitoring activities should not be headed by a single 
state politician.  A single politician is extremely vulnerable to political 
pressures because he bears the entire political costs of confronting the 
local leadership, but the financial health of a locality will not neces-
sarily be accredited to him.301  A multi-member commission, headed 
by appointed professionals or by a combination of professionals and 
politicians, is better suited to handle the political pressures.302  The 
commission should hire experts (economists and accountants) to ana-
lyze localities’ financial condition, and to decide whether the financial 
indicators specified in the statutory guidelines are triggered.  To the 
extent the indicators are triggered and a locality is in financial dis-
tress, the commission should implement rehabilitation measures, such 
 
(“What determines whether an independent agency ends up as an authoritarian cover 
up or as a positive force for accountable governance? I suggest that the answer lies in 
how these agencies respond to and deal with a series of challenges which together 
constitute what I call their institutional situation. Based on previous research on this 
topic, I propose four areas of particular importance: public legitimacy, institutional 
strength, second order accountability and bureaucratic stagnation.”); Rachel E. 
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (arguing that the traditional metrics for an independent agen-
cy are not the only effective ways in which insulation from interest group pressures 
can be achieved, and identifying additional, perhaps more effective, mechanisms to 
reach political independence); Marc Quintyn, Independent Agencies: More Than a 
Cheap Copy of Independent Central Banks, 20 CONST. POL. ECON. 267, 277 (2009) 
(presenting a model for independent agencies based on lessons from central banks’ 
independence and four pillars: independence, accountability, transparency, and in-
tegrity); Daniel Halberstam, The Promise of Comparative Administrative Law: A 
Constitutional Perspective on Independent Agencies, in COMP. ADMIN. L. 201 (Susan 
Rose Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010) (“But it would be mistaken to view 
such agencies as mere appendages or servants of parliament, the executive, or the ju-
diciary. Instead, we must recognize them for what they are: partially autonomous in-
stitutions of public governance demanding independent jurisdiction within the consti-
tutional constellation of which they form a part.”). 
 300. Scholars recommend a variety of mechanisms: removal of the agency’s offi-
cials only for cause, employment restrictions, independent funding, transparency, 
procedural restrictions such as notices and hearings, tools to generate and dissemi-
nate information, and more. See Barkow, supra note 299, at 27–28. 
 301. As explained earlier, residents often ignore the link between state policies and 
the local fiscal condition, and local policies are not very important in national elec-
tions. See supra Part II.A. 
 302. See Barkow, supra note 299, at 37–38.  
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as the appointment of an outside tax collector, comptroller, or control 
board. 
Note that I do not claim that such local government commission 
should determine the state’s policies towards the local sector.  The re-
lationship between the state and its localities is by its nature politi-
cal,303 and state policies in matters like local autonomy or local fi-
nance ought to be decided by the public’s representatives.304  I do, 
however, differentiate between policy-making and monitoring activi-
ties.  When it comes to monitoring, the balance between the political 
and the bureaucratic should change.  More emphasis should be put on 
expertise and less on representation.  The monitoring of local finance, 
after all, is a professional task.  It involves economic judgments, which 
are more technical in nature, and are based on objective indicia.  Dif-
ferent constituencies should not play a role when determining the fi-
nancial status of a certain locality, and political views should not be a 
factor when deciding on financial rehabilitation measures. 
Clearly there is no procedural process that can guarantee that the 
state’s monitoring will be done effectively.  Political interests will al-
ways exist, and independent agencies are not immunized from pres-
sures.  Evidence shows, however, that states that have implemented 
this type of process have improved their localities’ fiscal health.  This 
was the case in North Carolina and Ohio, which enacted special mu-
nicipal insolvency statutes, and created an orderly procedural mecha-
nism to help distressed localities.305  Jane Beckett-Camarata exam-
 
 303. Politics, broadly defined, is the process by which decisions are made about the 
allocation of goods in the society. See generally DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALY-
SIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 40–50 (1965). 
 304. Issues like the extent of local autonomy or the way localities should be fi-
nanced are by their nature political. They are connected to our beliefs about the ex-
tent of the state’s involvement in the economy, or to the way we view our democratic 
system. They involve ideology and values, and cannot be considered merely technical 
or professional. Thus, decision makers should have democratic accountability. They 
should represent their constituencies’ principles and beliefs, and be replaced to the 
extent their actions do not correspond to the needs and wishes of those who chose 
them. Cf. Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1059 
(1980) (arguing that the law governing cities should be explained as a political 
choice).  
 305. Ohio’s monitoring is conducted by the Office of the State’s Auditor. Depend-
ing on the severity of the local government’s problem, the Auditor may declare the 
government to be in fiscal watch or fiscal emergency. If a locality is placed in fiscal 
watch, the Auditor’s Office provides free assistance to help the government regain its 
financial footing. If a fiscal emergency is declared, a commission is appointed to over-
see the financial activities of the government until the emergency is terminated. See 
An Introduction to Fiscal Emergency, OHIO AUDITOR OF STATE 1, 17 (July 2004), 
http://www.auditor.state.oh.us/services/lgs/publications/GeneralPublications/IntroTo
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ined the effects of the Ohio legislation.306  She concluded that the leg-
islation had noticeable positive long term effects because the state 
was able to change the distressed localities’ destructive spending pat-
terns.307  The effects of the local government commission in North 
Carolina were even more outstanding.308  Credit rating agencies ap-
preciated the positive effects of the commission’s monitoring, and re-
warded it with increased credit ratings and lower interest rates.309 
In 2004, Israel enacted an amendment to the municipal ordinance 
that established ex ante guidelines to the state’s monitoring.310  The 
ordinance contains various financial indicators, and specifies different 
measures that the minister can implement depending on the locality’s 
fiscal condition.  The minister can appoint an external tax collector; 
he can appoint an external comptroller and he can even remove the 
local officials from their office.311  The ex ante guidelines improved 
 
FiscalEmergency.pdf.  North Carolina created a special commission to supervise local 
finance. The commission reviews and approves all issuances of local government 
debt, and it closely watches the local fiscal performance. In case of financial difficul-
ties, it assists the troubled locality, and assumes fiscal responsibility if needed. See 
Charles K. Coe, Preventing Local Government Fiscal Crises: The North Carolina 
Approach, 27 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 39, 40 (2007).   
 306. Jane Beckett-Camarata, Identifying and Coping with Fiscal Emergencies in 
Ohio Local Governments, 27 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 615, 616 (2004). 
 307. Id. at 626–28; see also Jim Petro, Ohio’s Fiscal Emergency Law Works: Pro-
tecting Tax Payers Dollars, CALL & POST (July 18, 1996), http://www.highbeam.com/ 
doc/1P3-582080331.html (“Ohio Fiscal Emergency Law is an example of efficient 
government action that protects and saves your money. How? By setting up an early 
warning system, the law helps local governments before they enter a full blown fiscal 
emergency.”). 
 308. See Coe, supra note 305, at 39. 
 309. See id.; Fahim, supra note 279; Larkin & Schaub, supra note 281, at 1. 
 310. See The Law of Economic Policy for Fiscal Year, 2004, SH No. 1920, p. 111 
(Isr.).   
 311. If the minister finds that a locality does not collect its taxes efficiently, he may 
appoint an external tax collector to levy the required taxes. See Municipalities Ordi-
nance, 1964, M.Y. 8, § 142A (Isr.). If a locality has a high level of deficit (10% or 
more of its current budget or 15% or more of its accumulative deficit), the minister 
can appoint an external comptroller. See Municipalities Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, 
(Isr.). The comptroller must approve all local expenditures, and the locality cannot 
enter into contractual obligations without the comptroller’s consent. Third, if the 
minister or an appointed investigation committee determines that the local officials 
do not perform their legal tasks properly, then the minister is entitled to remove the 
mayor and the aldermen from office and to appoint a control board. See Municipali-
ties Ordinance, 1964, M.Y. 8, §§ 143–143A (Isr.). The chairman of the board possess-
es the mayor’s authorities, and the board members serve as aldermen.  
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the local fiscal health,312 but since all the authorities are vested with 
the Minister of Interior, the situation is still far from optimal.  As we 
have seen, the Minister is subject to heavy political pressure, and he 
does not always use his discretion to the best interests of the local sec-
tor.313  In 2007, the Minister of Interior even attempted to discharge a 
senior official in the Ministry for not favoring Kadima mayors.314  The 
official declined to approve Kadima members to various positions in 
the local sector, and was unwilling to follow the Minister’s instruc-
tions to terminate the appointment of external comptrollers appoint-
ed in localities whose mayor is a Kadima member.315  In the end, the 
discharge was not carried out,316 but the affair shows the extent of po-
liticization in the Ministry of Interior. 
CONCLUSION 
The Israeli local crisis is still far from resolved. The 2004 amend-
ments improved the state’s supervision, but many local governments, 
especially Arab municipalities, still face severe financial difficulties. 
The central government does not adequately finance the local sector, 
and the chronic problems described in this Article have not disap-
peared.317 Attempts to reform the state monitoring system and render 
it more politically independent have failed, mainly as a result of the 
Ministry of Interior’s resistance. The Ministry was reluctant to lose its 
control and objected to the creation of a more professional local gov-
ernment commission.318 
This Article attempted to analyze the motives behind such state 
behaviors.  It showed the complexity of the relationship between the 
 
 312. See BEN BASSAT & DAHAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT CRISIS, supra note 165, at 
51 (noting that after 2004 the central government increased its involvement in the lo-
cal sector, it improved the local sector fiscal condition). 
 313. See supra notes 204–38 and accompanying text. 
 314. See The Head of the Local Government Monitoring Department in the Minis-
try of Interior Refused to Favor Kadima Mayors—and Was Discharged Due to Lack 
of Managerial Skills, GLOBES (Aug. 24, 2008), http://www.globes.co.il/news/article. 
aspx?did=1000375022 (on file with author).    
 315. Id. 
 316. See Rani Fintzi’s Discharge Was Annulled—The Ministry of Interior Called 
off the Search for His Replacement, GLOBES (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.globes.co.il/ 
news/article.aspx?did=1000376261.   
 317. The Local Fiscal Crisis, Hearing Before the Parliamentary Finance Commit-
tee of the Knesset (Oct. 11, 2010).  
 318. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF FINANCE, A PROPOSAL FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
FOR THE YEARS 2009–2010, at 202 (2009), available at http://www.shelly.org.il/files/ 
hesderim2009.pdf.  
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two levels of government and the inherent conflicts of interest that 
exist in the state’s monitoring.  Through the Israeli experience, we see 
the benefits that state politicians can derive from a feeble local sector 
and the political costs that are associated with efficient state supervi-
sion.  This Article does not claim to offer an exhaustive solution to 
these problems, but it does suggest that an efficient credit market and 
certain procedural mechanisms may help mitigate some of the diffi-
culties. 
